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Abstract 
 
 
This paper develops 30 novel quantitative indicators of grand corruption that operationalize 
20 distinct techniques of corruption in the context of public procurement. Each indicator 
rests on a thorough qualitative understanding of rent extraction from public contracts by 
corrupt networks as evidenced by academic literature, interviews and media content 
analysis. Feasibility and usefulness of the proposed indicators are demonstrated using 
micro-level public procurement data from Hungary in 2009-2012. While the prime value of 
this broad set of indicators is the possibility of combining them into a robust composite 
indicator of high-level corruption, the high degree of detail also reveals that many 
regulatory interventions have succeeded in changing the form of corruption, but not its 
overall incidence. 
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Korrupciós kézikönyv kezdőknek 
 Korrupciós technikák a közbeszerzésben  
– magyar példákkal 
Fazekas Mihály - Tóth István János - Lawrence Peter King 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány harminc új kvantitatív korrupciós indikátorra tesz javaslatot, melyek húsz 
különböző korrupciós technikát operacionalizálnak. Ezek segítségével a közbeszerzésekben 
érvényesülő ún. nagy korrupciót (grand corruption) lehet megfigyelni és kvantitatívan 
elemezni. Az összes általunk kifejlesztett indikátor a közbeszerzésekben előforduló és a 
korrupt szereplők hálózatán keresztül megvalósuló járadékvadászat kvalitatív leírásán 
alapul. A kvalitatív információkat résztvevőkkel készített interjúkból, a vonatkozó 
szakirodalomból és a magyar média tartalomelemzésből nyertük. Az általunk javasolt 
korrupciós indikátorok alkalmazhatóságát és hasznosságát a magyar közbeszerzések 2009–
2012 közötti mikroadatain mutatjuk be. Az indikátorok legnagyobb hozadéka egy olyan 
kompozit indikátor kialakításának a lehetősége, amely kvantitatív eszközökkel képes mérni 
a korrupció kockázatát a közbeszerzések területén. Emellett az egyedi, a szereplők 
magatartására vonatkozó korrupciós indikátorok olyan magatartási jellemzőket is feltárnak, 
amelyek a korrupció változatosságáról és a szabályozáshoz való alkalmazkodásáról 
tudósítanak. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: közbeszerzés, nagy korrupció, korrupciós technikák, korrupciós 
indikátorok, kvantitatív elemzés 
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1. Introduction 
While there have been recent advances in measuring and understanding petty or low-level 
corruption (e.g. Charron, Lapuente, and Rothstein 2013; Rose and Peiffer 2012), research into 
grand or high-level corruption1 has remained underdeveloped in the last decades. This is in 
large part due to the lack of data. In order to advance research as well as evidence based policy, 
reliable indicators are needed to gauge the structure and the magnitude of grand corruption. 
Data based on perceptions and formal institutional structures are plentiful, but these have not 
proven particularly useful in unearthing the mechanisms creating and sustaining grand 
corruption. The only way forward is to understand the micro-level context of grand corruption 
in particular fields of government activity such as public investment, law-making, or issuing 
permits and licenses and to develop qualitative and quantitative indicators based on a 
thorough understanding of the corruption process. 
Below, technologies of grand corruption in public procurement are described and 
corresponding quantitative indicators are developed which directly or indirectly signal their 
use. What we call corruption techniques are techniques used by corrupt actors to make their 
corrupt, often illegal, acts look legal and to hide their actions from the eyes of the public. For 
example, making competition for a public contract look fair and open whereas the winner and 
the contract value were already agreed before the launch of the tendering process. Each 
corruption technique is described in abstract terms by outlining its characteristic elements, the 
actors’ reasons for resorting to it, the constraints on application, and some real-life examples 
as reported by the media, the courts, or our interviewees. The list of these techniques which is 
far from complete, can nevertheless be considered as novel scientific result in itself. However, 
the main rationale for their structured discussion is to provide solid theoretical and 
methodological ground for quantitative indicators of grand corruption. These techniques can 
be considered as the input side of the public procurement corruption process where the output 
side is the collection of rents by the ‘right’2 organisations and individuals. We intend to define 
the list of indicators as comprehensively as possible because techniques can be used 
interchangeably and in combination making the measurement quality of overall corrupt 
activities ultimately dependent on the adequacy of this list. 
Corruption techniques are grouped by referring to the different stages of the public 
procurement process (see section 2.2) in order to highlight the interdependencies between 
them and to emphasize the process, flow character of such corruption instead of a static 
                                               
1 Grand corruption (or state capture) refers to societal actors’ institutionalized and particularistic 
influence over public rule formation or policy implementation through private payments or favours. 
2 Throughout this paper, the terms ‘right’, ‘desired’, or ‘wanted’ organisation refers to those 
organisations who form part of corrupt networks and are deliberately benefiting from corrupt rent 
allocation. A prime example is a company owned by the cousin of the mayor winning procurement 
contracts from the municipality in question. 
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understanding. It is important to keep in mind that grand corruption is institutionalized, 
recurrent, and mobilizes considerable collective resources so elementary techniques must be 
seen as parts of a larger corrupt process. Each corruption technique involves violation of 
principles of good public procurement in order to achieve corrupt benefits even if narrowly 
defined laws and regulations are not infringed upon. While there are many possible errors and 
deviations from good public procurement principles (European Court of Auditors 2012), what 
makes the below corruption techniques intertwined with grand corruption is that they are 
typically used by corrupt groups to hide and legalize their actions. That is, the below list only 
contains those techniques which are reportedly employed by such groups as described by the 
media, courts, academic literature, and interviewees in Hungary. Hence, techniques and 
actions which may simply result from administrative error and incompetence are not 
discussed in this section as they cannot be reliably linked to grand corruption. 
When defining individual techniques we followed the simple rule that each of them 
should be able to lead to corrupt rent extraction on its own if applied skilfully. This enabled us 
to identify the elementary building blocks of more complex corrupt strategies whose exact 
composition changes over time as regulation changes. Moreover, in practice, elementary 
techniques are typically combined with each other and various degrees of complementarities 
and substitutions exist among them (e.g. once all the ‘unwanted’ bidders are excluded on 
administrative grounds there is no need for subjectively applying award criteria to ‘unwanted’ 
bidders).  
The below listed techniques are explained from the viewpoint of tender issuers which, 
nevertheless, does not indicate that it has to be the issuer who initiates the corrupt transaction 
or that the issuer possesses all or most of the knowledge necessary for managing the corrupt 
transaction. Taking the perspective of the issuer simply acknowledges the fact that it is the 
issuer who, at the end of the day, has to formally manage the process of public procurement. 
Interviews indicated that the initiation of the corrupt exchange or de facto management may 
very well be done by a powerful and well-connected company or a politically supported public 
procurement adviser. For example, the head of public procurement department of a major 
construction company reported: “I wrote the full tender documentation myself which was 
subsequently sent out to all bidders.”. 
As we look at grand corruption and state capture primarily as resulting from collusion 
between some public and private actors, only those techniques of corruption are discussed 
below which involve or require the deliberate collaboration of the issuer, even though it may 
well be that multiple bidders take part in the corrupt transaction (e.g. the politically connected 
winning bidder pays off 2-3 other companies to mimic competition). By implication, cartels 
and likes involving bidders only are not part of the discussion. 
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In order to identify as complete and reliable list of corruption techniques as possible a number 
of data collection methods were used in Hungary: 
 the small body of academic literature was screened, including secondary analysis of 
interviews done by other researchers, 
 a review of media reports of concrete corruption cases was conducted,  
 original interviews were carried out with public procurement practitioners who have 
seen corrupt transactions close up, and  
 some court cases relating to public procurement corruption were reviewed.  
First, we reviewed the small body of directly relevant academic literature of the last 10 
years looking at corruption involving public procurement in Hungary and international 
research papers specifically looking at public procurement corruption. This literature collected 
data by interviews, surveys and media reviews; in addition, a few papers made use of 
administrative data and court cases. As the literature is small, standard keyword searches 
yielded very few documents, hence our search strategy largely relied on exploring the 
bibliographic network of key publications. The literature review combined with our own ideas 
spawned the initial list and definitions of corruption techniques further refined by additional 
data collection. 
Second, the review of media reports covered all major online newspapers of Hungary 
such as www.index.hu, www.origo.hu, www.fn.hu, www.mno.hu, http://vg.hu, 
http://hetivalasz.hu, www.nol.hu, http://hvg.hu, and www.hir24.hu which together cover the 
whole political spectrum from the left to the right. Many of these have a print edition too, but 
our review was constrained to the online material which is mostly equivalent or even more 
extensive than the print version. The time period of systematic analysis was between 1/1/2008 
and 1/8/20123, but further articles are also included from later dates if they were brought to 
our attention. Due to technical issues with newspaper archives there was some random 
variation in the completeness of our sample, that is some months are missing from the sample. 
However, this doesn’t weaken the analysis as the goal is to find examples rather than establish 
the prevalence of certain techniques in the press. Among all the articles of these online 
newspapers, we initially selected those that contained any keywords associated with 
corruption (concrete list of keywords can be found in Appendix A). In a second step, from this 
large sample of articles, we identified those which discussed a corruption case in public 
procurement in detail (i.e. simply stating that this and this contract award was corrupt and 
benefited this and this individuals was not good enough for selection). In the final step, this 
short list of articles was checked again by the authors and were categorised according to a pre-
defined initial list of corruption techniques. Based on articles describing techniques beyond 
                                               
3 In the case of http://hvg.hu and http://vg.hu we only had the online content starting from 1/11/2010. 
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our initial list, new corruption techniques were defined leading to a list covering all the articles 
in the sample. The results of the media review can be found in Appendix A. 
Third, interviews with public procurement practitioners ‘close’ to corrupt transactions 
were carried out to explore the underlying rationale of each corruption technique, gather 
specific examples (without concrete names), verify whether the techniques are typically used 
in corrupt transactions, and to identify additional corruption techniques. We conducted semi-
structured interviews lasting for about 1-1.5 hours with 14 individuals covering all three major 
actor categories of public procurement (issuers, bidders, and advisors). They work in 
construction, healthcare, and IT services sectors taking part in projects ranging from large 
infrastructure projects of millions of EUR to small services contracts of few thousand EUR. In 
all but one case, the interviewees either referred to concrete cases they saw from ‘close’ or 
described the suitability of a corruption technique in general to reach corrupt goals based on 
their experience. Given the sensitive nature of the topic, interviewees avoided explicitly 
mentioning names of individuals or companies. The interview evidence formed the basis on 
which the final list of corruption techniques was further refined. 
Finally, there have been about 600-700 convictions per year by Hungarian courts on the 
basis of corruption charges between 1990 and 20094 and more than 1500 Hungarian court 
decisions mentioning “public procurement” since 20055. While we could already obtain the 
text of court decisions, it requires additional work to systematically categorize and check these 
cases against the below list of corruption techniques. In addition, decisions of the European 
Court of Justice should also be screened and analysed to cover the full spectrum of judicial 
review of public procurement in Hungary. We only look at the documents referring to high 
profile court cases that were reported by the press. 
2. Principles and models of good public procurement  
At the heart of grand corruption in public procurement lies the simple fact that public 
procurement legislation in the EU and Hungary in particular prescribes basic universalistic 
principles which must be violated in order to collect the corruption rents. As grand corruption 
may very well succeed in appearing legal according to the detailed regulations covering public 
contract award, it is the underlying general principles which define clearly what is corrupt and 
what is not. 
Thus, below we outline the underlying principles of good public procurement and define 
a simple abstract model of procurement activities allowing for grouping of corruption 
                                               
4 For annual figures and details of case identification see: http://www.crc.uni-
corvinus.hu/download/korrupcios_buncselekmenyek_1972_2009_100428.xls 
5 http://www.birosag.hu/engine.aspx?page=anonim  
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techniques. Each of the corruption techniques and the corresponding indicator relates to a 
specific public procurement activity and an underlying principle whose breach implies 
corruption.  
2.1 Principles of good public procurement 
While there is a multitude of principles of good public procurement in the academic and policy 
literatures as well as in EU and national laws, there are considerable overlaps among them 
paving the way for a synthesis valid for the last 10 years (i.e. about 2002-2012) (Arrowsmith 
2009, 2010 ch. 1. OECD 2007; Transparency International 2006). While many of the 
principles in the literature relate to actual outcomes of public procurement such as efficiency 
of spending, our focus exclusively lies in the process of public procurement in order to aid later 
discussions of corruption techniques employed during procurement procedures.  
The principles relating to the process of public procurement directly derive from the 
ideas of public sector integrity and impartial government creating the link between the general 
discussions of corruption and state capacity and the domain of public procurement. Hence, 
good public procurement rests on three principles which mutually support each other: 
 Transparency,  
 Fair competition6, and  
 Accountability. 
The principle of transparency means that information about public procurement should 
be readily available in a precise, reliable, and structured form for the public as a whole or its 
representatives (Kovacic et al. 2006; OECD 2007; Soreide 2002). Transparency should 
concern all the information pertaining to the public procurement process and outcomes such 
as general laws, regulations, judicial decisions, administrative rulings, procedures and policies 
on public procurement, statistics on procurement activities, and individual procedures and 
award decisions. While excess transparency may harm competition (e.g. disclosure of 
commercially sensitive information), transparency in Hungary is generally considered to be 
too restricted rather than too extensive (Freedom House 2012; Tóth and Márkus 2010). 
The principle of fair competition means that potential bidders should have equal 
opportunities for participation, contract award decisions should be impartial, and that public 
procurement rules should be applied equally to all contractors (Arrowsmith 2009). That is, 
fair competition implies a level playing field for every potential and actual competitor. In 
general, decision making procedures should be rule-bound whereby every rule is transparently 
                                               
6 Even though fair competition also applies to the absence of collusion among bidders, this aspect is 
deliberately left aside in order to concentrate attention to corruption and the private-public nexus. 
There is evidence that corruption and collusion tend to go together, even though they are distinct 
phenomena (OECD 2010a). 
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accessible to potential and actual bidders. Naturally, bidders may be treated differently if 
reasonable justification for such treatment is specified prior to the procedure. However, this 
discretion should also be exercised in an accountable manner. 
The principle of accountability means that issuing authorities and their officers, public 
procurement advisors, and bidder companies and their employees should be held accountable 
for their actions according to their pre-defined duties and tasks (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 2011; Transparency International 2006). Accountability 
primarily refers to 1) effective mechanisms and capacity for internal control and audit; and 2) 
effective mechanisms for filing complaints and challenging public procurement decisions. 
Accountability is also essential for ensuring fair competition. As accountability mechanisms 
are typically very costly both for the state and the bidding companies, balance between costs 
and benefits of accountability systems must be struck. 
Grand corruption in public procurement, therefore, implies that some or all of these 
principles are systematically and recurrently breached in the conduct of procurement by 
some actors in order to obtain unfair benefits in competition and contracting (e.g. higher 
than market price).   
The above should make it clear that the definition of grand corruption employed here 
may or may not imply breaking any laws as defined by Hungarian courts and law-makers. 
While at the level of principles our definition and the legal definition perfectly matches, 
actions deemed corrupt according to our definition may seem completely lawful in light of the 
detailed prescriptions of public procurement and related laws. For a transaction to be deemed 
corrupt here, neither bribery nor coercion is a necessary condition (Jancsics and Jávor 2012; 
Szántó and Tóth 2008). 
2.2 Standard model of public procurement 
The standard model of public procurement enumerates the major actors and defines the key 
phases of the process in order to allow for a structured discussion of corruption techniques. 
Public procurement requires interaction among three major actors while there is a range of 
external actors intervening under some circumstances (Transparency International 2006). 
The three actors internal to the public procurement process are 1) issuers of tender, 2) public 
procurement advisors or brokers, and 3) bidder companies. There are external actors within 
the state such as 4) politicians who can also take on senior civil service positions; and 5) review 
bodies such as courts, state audit institutions, and competition agencies. The external actors 
outside the state are the 6) media and 7) the civil society.  
The academic and policy literature identifies four major phases of the public 
procurement process spanning from the identification of organisational need up until the 
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implementation and conclusion of the contract (Byatt 2001; Piga 2011; Thai 2009; 
Transparency International 2006; Várday 2005). 
1. Needs assessment; 
2. Process design and document preparation; 
3. Tender evaluation and award decision; and 
4. Contract implementation and management. 
The needs assessment phase involves determining the object and quantity of the 
procurement task in line with the organisation’s needs. The process design and document 
preparation phase translates the decisions of the previous phase into the specific context of 
public procurement according to national laws and the organisation’s own regulations (e.g. 
drafting the text of call for tenders). During the tender evaluation and award decision phase 
the bids are assessed according to the pre-defined criteria and contract is concluded with the 
winning bidder. The contract implementation phase encompasses all the activities which 
relate to managing and monitoring the implementation of the contract and its modifications. 
The main decision points and steps of the public procurement process are highlighted in 
Figure 1 together with indications of officially available data in Hungary. The figure makes it 
clear that the only phase where there is no official data in the Public Procurement Bulletin is 
the needs assessment phase. Hence, our indicators won’t cover these, quite important, aspects 
of public procurement, for example corruption may arise during planning a road construction 
project which otherwise is lawfully executed when the road unfairly benefits some who happen 
to own land along the planned path (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). While, corruption techniques 
can be mapped on to each step of the public procurement process (see section 4), it is 
suggested that they are typically used in concert to achieve the desired particularistic decision 
highlighting the important difference between official steps and procedures and informal 
decisions and power relations. 
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Figure 1.  
A simplified model of the public procurement process 
 
Note: The rectangles mark those steps of the public procurement process which do not require 
decisions of the actor while the rhombuses mark those steps which require decisions. The red framing 
of some rectangles indicate that data is available from official sources in Hungary. 
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3. The data 
The database used for developing the quantitative indicators corresponding to individual 
corruption techniques derive from Hungarian public procurement announcements from 
between 2009-2012 (e.g. individual contracts, calls for tender, court rulings on the decisions) 
(this database is referred to as PP henceforth).The data represent a complete database of all 
public procurement procedures conducted under national Public Procurement Law in 
Hungary. As already highlighted in Figure 1, among the different steps of any public 
procurement procedure there is a legal obligation to publish i) call for tender in most cases, ii) 
contract awards in every case, iii) modification of contract in every case, iv) completion of 
contract in most cases (the obligation ceased as of 1/1/2012), v) results of legal proceedings in 
every case (e.g. court decisions regarding contract awards), and vi) errors and corrections of 
previous announcements in every instance. Our database contains most of the variables 
regularly appearing as required by law in each of these announcements such as the name and 
address of the winner company or the contract value. 
The place of publication of these documents is the Public Procurement Bulletin which 
appears on a weekly basis and is accessible online7. For this publication, the Hungarian Public 
Procurement Authority maintains a homepage where online announcements appear and a 
database supporting publication. Unfortunately, the Authority was unwilling to share its data 
with us (and it has also been unwilling to share its data with other key public institutions such 
as the Hungarian Competition Authority as our interview evidence indicates). By implication, 
we downloaded all the announcements available online mainly in html sometimes in pdf 
format. Then these texts became the source of our structured database which contains 
variables with clear meaning and well-defined categories. As the original texts available online 
and most likely the underlying database of the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority 
contain a range of errors, inconsistencies, and omissions we applied several correction 
measures to arrive at a database sufficient quality for quantitative analysis (detailed account of 
data cleaning procedures can be found in Hungarian in Fazekas & Tóth (2012a) and in English 
with somewhat less detail in Fazekas & Tóth (2012b)). 
A major limitation of our database is that it only contains information on public 
procurement cases under the Hungarian Public Procurement Law as there is no central 
depository of other contracts. This law defines minimum estimated contract value for its 
application depending on the type of announcing body and kind of products or services to be 
procured (for example, from 1 January 2012, classical issuers have to follow the national 
regulations if they procure services for more than 8 million HUF or 27 thousand EUR). Some 
public organisations can be rather resourceful in circumventing the law if they find it in their 
                                               
7 See: http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/nid/KE (in Hungarian) 
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interest (e.g. slicing up contracts so that the parts are under the threshold, or resorting to 
special exemptions). This is indicated by, for example, the gap between the OECD’s estimation 
of public procurement in Hungary based on aggregate budget data: 20% of the GDP (2008)8 
(OECD 2011) and the amount of public procurement carried out under the Public Procurement 
Law: 7% (2008) (Hungarian Public Procurement Authority 2009). 
Having data only on larger and more heavily regulated public procurement results is an 
obviously biased sample of all public procurement contracts. Larger contracts are rarer events 
than the rest of public contracting which limits the quantitative scope of our analysis. They are 
also more demanding administratively not only simply due to their sheer size, but also because 
of stricter regulations. Most importantly, procedures carried out under the Public 
Procurement Law are heavily regulated in terms of transparency (e.g. format and organ of 
announcements) and fairness (e.g. nature of award criteria or time available for tendering). 
While these regulations may well be flawed in a range of ways they definitely increase the cost 
of corruption. Moreover, larger contracts imply larger potential benefits from corruption. 
Hence, our sample of all public contracts is biased towards more costly and more high stakes 
corruption which indicates that any analysis of such data can be indicative only of grand 
corruption and state capture rather than petty corruption. 
Contract award notices represent the most important part of a procedure’s life-cycle. For 
each procedure under the Hungarian Public Procurement Law, at least the contract award 
announcement has to be published. Thus, we show some elementary statistics relating to 
contract awards in order to provide an overview of the data. Out of the 84085 awarded 
contracts announced in the Hungarian Public Procurement Bulleting throughout 2009-2012 
only 53272 were analysed in most calculations due to five distinctive, but sometimes 
overlapping reasons (Table 1):9 
1. Repetitions, 
2. Corrections,  
3. Unsuccessfulness,  
4. Cancellations, and 
5. Framework contracts. 
 
 
                                               
8 Even though it must be noted that the OECD’s estimation is an upper bound estimate. 
9 In fact, we should extend our data with one sample referring to centralised procurement whereby 
issuers don’t procure on their own rather through a centralised body. Unfortunately, we don’t yet have 
detailed data on who bought what and how much from this central public procurement body. For the 
moment, we account for centralised procurement as one other issuer without knowing the details of the 
flows of goods and services between individual issuers and the central body. Data acquisition is in 
progress. 
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First, Hungarian announcements above the EU threshold have to be published both at 
the Journal of the European Union (TED) and the Hungarian Public Procurement Bulletin. 
However, for reasons unknown to the authors, the announcements appearing in TED also 
appear according to a special format in the Hungarian Public Procurement Bulletin. This leads 
to duplication of announcements with only slightly different information content (e.g. 
announcements in TED don’t contain the names of bidders who lost, whereas notices in the 
Hungarian Public Procurement Bulletin do). In order to avoid double counting and retain 
maximum possible information content we excluded all the contract award notices appearing 
originally in TED and reappearing at the Hungarian Public Procurement Bulleting too. 
Second, those announcements which were later corrected by a full, repeated announcement 
were also excluded from our sample for most analyses.10 More work is needed on this aspect as 
corrections are not referenced in a standardised fashion in many cases. Third, those 
announcements or parts of announcements which were contract award notices, but awarded 
no contract were also excluded. Unsuccessfulness or invalidity are explicitly marked in the 
announcements; however, as there was no name of winner in a great number of 
announcements, it is unclear if these are actually invalid announcements or data is simply 
missing. As crucial information is often missing, we did not exclude these notices. Fourth, 
cancellations refer to those announcements which were announced as valid and correct, 
however, subsequently had to be withdrawn or modified due to court decisions or withdrawal 
of the winner. Finally, framework contracts are awarded in two stages whereby winning the 
contract at the first stage only implies the possibility of bidding for contracts within the 
framework leading to actual work and payments. Hence, contract awards referring to the first 
stage of framework contracts are excluded in order to avoid double counting contract values. 
  
                                               
10 As many corrections don’t appear completely anew, rather a specific correction is published that 
explains which parts of the original announcement were wrong and what the correct information is, we 
inputed the correct data to the corrected announcements. This introduces a slight bias to our sample as 
correct information appears to be available in our data earlier than it was in fact for the public. As this 
only concerns 132 contract award announcements, we consider this to be of relatively minor importance 
(there are additional corrections for other types of announcements which we still need to take into 
account). 
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Table 1.  
Main statistics of the analysed data – contracts 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Estimated number of procedures observed 9051 12861 10599 9319 41830 
Total number of contracts observed 21130 28630 17443 16882 84085 
Total number of repeated contracts 6932 5626 995 4786 18339 
Total number of corrected contracts* 4 81 43 0 128 
Total number of unsuccessful contracts 2137 3767 1766 1740 9410 
Total number of cancelled contracts 1193 1831 331 314 3669 
Total number of framework contracts 984 608 317 888 2797 
Total number of non-repeated, correct, valid, non-
cancelled, and non-framework contracts 
10982 17769 14140 10381 53272 
Combined value of non-repeated, correct, valid, non-
cancelled, and non-framework contracts (million 
EUR) ** 
4490 3527 1993 1295 11305 
Source: PP 
Notes: *=the number of corrected contracts may further increase as additional search 
procedures are completed; ** = a 300 HUR/EUR uniform exchange rate was applied for 
exchanging HUF values. 
4. “Technologies” of corruption 
This section discusses each corruption technique and the corresponding indicators (note that 
some indicators relate to multiple techniques). Discussion follows a simple structure in each 
case: underlying rationale for using the technique, the principle of good public procurement 
breached, control mechanisms, some real-life examples, and indicators. Techniques are 
grouped according to the four major phases of the public procurement process (process design 
and document preparation are put under different headings in order to avoid any single 
heading containing too many techniques).  
Indicators are formulated in a way that they are as closely associated with the underlying 
corruption technique as possible. However, there are complex non-linearities in the 
relationship between corruption and procurement characteristics so in many cases further 
refinement will be necessary through linking indicators to each other and potentially corrupt 
outcomes.  
As the present discussion takes the viewpoint of tender issuers, the indicators primarily 
aim at capturing organisational behaviour (i.e. choices made by individual organisations) 
rather than meso- to macro level influences such as complexity of technology or investment 
projects of particular markets. Hence, in cases where strong market-level influences are 
suspected (e.g. complexity of technology is likely to impact heavily on complexity of eligibility 
criteria), the indicators are adjusted to reflect deviations from the market mean. While this 
focuses the indicator on organisational decisions, it also impedes cross-market comparisons. 
Thus, corruption risks emanating from the fact that an organisation operates on a particular 
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market are downplayed even though they may be powerful contributing factors to its overall 
corrupt behaviour. 
4.1 Needs assessment and definition 
T1.1 Defining unnecessary need 
Issuers of tenders can choose to procure goods and services which are in fact not necessary for 
them or procure them in a size and quantity excessive compared to their actual needs 
(Heggstad and Froystad 2011; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Transparency International 2006). 
When this benefits particular supplier(s) mis-assessment of needs can serve as a corruption 
technique (for a US example see Goldman et al., 2012 p. 11). By arbitrarily increasing the 
quantity and overall price of procured goods and services (e.g. by adding unnecessary 
capacities), the earned corruption fee can be increased as it tends to increase with overall 
contract value. Hence, this technique works well with other techniques allowing for limiting 
competition hence making it easy to capture rents. 
In principle, there is a range of control mechanisms which are intended to make this 
technique difficult and costly to implement. These are the reviews of the State Audit 
Organisation (SAO), judicial review, and public/media scrutiny. Even though there have been 
instances when these presented an effective barrier, control functions are very limited in 
general (State Audit Organisation 2008). 
Prime examples of this kind of technique in Hungary come from large infrastructure 
projects, especially highway construction such as M7 or M6 in the recent years. In the latter 
case, a pan-European investigation was launched in November 2012 on charges of corruption 
and bribery. According to media reports these highways were constructed with additional 
unnecessary content such as tunnels on flat surfaces, the (in)famous viaduct of Kőröshegy 
which turned out to be one of CEE’s largest such construct in spite of going through an only 
mildly hilly area. Moreover, some stories told by interviewees outline the usual approach 
whereby it is not the need which gets defined first, but the supply; that is, the company 
providing a particular service or goods and knowing about a relevant EU funding opportunity 
seeks an issuer to ‘join-in’ (Szántó and Tóth 2008). 
This technique is one of those few for which no quantitative indicator is proposed at this 
stage of the research. Later on, case by case analysis could be conducted involving additional 
data collection in order to reveal excess procurement content for example by comparing 
procured values of issuers with comparable needs (e.g. capacity of photo-copy machines for 
municipalities of similar size).  
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T1.2 Defining need in a way to benefit a particular supplier 
Issuers of tenders can choose to procure goods and services in a form or with capacities which 
are unnecessary for fulfilling their actual needs, but are advantageous for certain supplier(s) 
(Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Transparency International 2006; World Bank 2007). If the issuer 
requires characteristics and capacities which can only be performed by a single supplier’s 
goods and services, fair competition can be ruled out right from the beginning. Such 
requirements are most easily defined on markets where products and services have a high 
number of very specific characteristics such as large infrastructure construction or IT 
infrastructure and services. This technique largely supports other means of tailoring the public 
procurement process to one bidder (T2.2). 
This kind of corruption is difficult to detect as knowing what is actually needed by an 
organisation is difficult to decipher by external control bodies (i.e. problem of information 
asymmetry). The Hungarian SAO regularly audits individual pubic organisations and conducts 
more comprehensive public procurement reviews, but these concern only a selected set of 
organisations over longer time periods making detection rather unlikely. Moreover, the lack of 
long term vision for sectors or the whole country make assessment of investment needs close 
to impossible as there is no solid benchmark (Báger 2011). Supporting institutions such as the 
Hungarian National Development Agency or the European Commission’s OLAF and European 
Court of Auditors also conduct reviews which have the potential to detect ‘tailored’ 
procurement, but they are likely to be ineffective due to information asymmetries and narrow 
focus on financial compliance. 
There is one direct quantitative indicator for this technique suggested by the literature 
(Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti 2009):  
A) prevalence of avoiding centralised procurement. 
Centralised procurement systems replace the multitude of local procurement processes 
with a few large purchases. Buying directly from the centralised procurement authority (in 
Hungary the Public Procurement and Supplies Bureau or Közbeszerzési és Ellátási 
Főigazgatóság) is likely to decrease corruption risks of local entities as they can no longer 
influence contract award (Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti 2009). However, this logic is crucially 
dependent on the quality, price, and flexibility of centrally procured provision. In an 
environment ridden with systemic corruption, centralised purchasing simply centralises 
corruption and state capture leading to low quality and/or high price provision (Piga 2011). 
Indeed, interview evidence suggests that, depending on the centralised procurement contract 
covering a specific market such as hospital stationery, or furniture, centralised procurement 
maybe more or less competitive than local procurement. If centralised procurement is more 
efficient than potential local procurement corrupt tender issuers are more likely to opt out of 
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the central system and conduct procurement locally. However, if the centralised contract is 
less competitive than the potential local ones even non-corrupt, well-governed issuers opt out. 
Assuming further research can reveal the relative efficiency of centralised purchasing, the 
adequate indicator is the following: 
PACPit = (PPVit - CPPVit ) / PPVit 
where PACPit refers to the proportion of not-purchasing through centralised public 
procurement within total value of contracts awarded according to the Public Procurement Law 
by the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over period t, PPVit denotes the 
total value of contracts awarded according to the Public Procurement Law by the ith unit of 
observation during period t, and CPPVit refers to the total purchasing through centralised 
public procurement of the ith unit of observation over period t. As centralised purchasing is 
not available in every product and services markets only those spending items are taken into 
account which could be in principle obtained through centralised spending. 
Unfortunately, we are still in negotiation with the Hungarian Public Procurement and 
Supplies Bureau for obtaining public organisation and product specific data. Consequentially, 
this indicator could not be calculated here. 
4.2 Process design 
T2.1 Tinkering with the threshold and exceptional rules 
In Hungary like in any other European country, the application of the Public Procurement Law 
as well as the different procedural regimes is dependent on expected contract value thresholds 
and a range of specific exceptions (On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public 
Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts 2004). Application 
conditions such as thresholds are crucial for corruption, first, as public procurement outside 
the Public Procurement Law is typically less stringently regulated in terms of transparency and 
open competition; second, different procedural regimes prescribe different degrees of 
transparency and openness (OECD 2010b). For example, the open regime requires issuers to 
publish a call for tenders in the Public Procurement Bulletin whereas the negotiation 
procedure does not. Hence, bringing procedures outside the applicability of the Public 
Procurement Law or into a less open and competitive procedural regime under the law 
provides better opportunities for hiding corrupt action (Heggstad and Froystad 2011; Kenny 
and Musatova 2010; OECD 2007; Transparency International 2006).  
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Moving procedures across public procurement regimes or completely outside the remit 
of the Public Procurement Law can be done in three principal ways:  
1. Slicing up contracts so that they fall out from the unwanted public procurement 
procedural regime (e.g. below the national threshold) (Papanek 2009 ch. 6; Piga 2011);  
2. invoking special rules of exception such as national security or extreme urgency (OECD 
2007; Schultz and Soreide 2008; Soreide 2002); and  
3. underestimating expected contract value (expected contract value is the basis for 
mandatory regime choice).  
In addition, corrupt networks capable of moving contracts across public organisations 
can also resort to channelling money through institutions falling outside the remit of the 
Public Procurement Law such as the Hungarian Development Bank (Major Dezsériné 2003; 
Papanek 2009 ch. 6). Due to the difficulty of detecting quantitatively this latter technique no 
further discussion is offered. 
As conducting public procurement according to different procedural regimes also has 
considerable costs for the issuers (i.e. some procedures are more costly than others) smaller or 
poorer issuers may also try to use this technique for cost saving reasons. By implication, the 
use of this technique as a signal of corruption should be seen in the light of issuer size and 
wealth. 
The choice of procedural regime or the avoidance of applying the Public Procurement 
Law has wide-ranging impacts on other indicators and the structure of the PP database. First, 
contracts outside the remit of the Public Procurement Law are not recorded in the PP 
database. The only trace of such purchases is in public organisations’ annual budget figures 
from which estimates can be constructed for overall procurement (Audet 2002; European 
Commission 2011). Second, choice of procedural regime impacts on the availability of other 
corruption techniques which we discuss below: T2.6-Submission deadline and T3.2-
Publication of calls for tender. While issuers’ hands are tied in terms of minimum submission 
deadlines and mandatory publication of calls for tender if they conduct an open procedure, 
they are offered more choice when using other regimes. By implication, the choice of regime 
type determines submission deadline and call for tenders publication to some degree in an 
asymmetric way. Third, the procedure choice may also support the use of other corruption 
techniques, especially T2.2-Tailoring eligibility criteria and T2.4-Tailoring evaluation criteria. 
It is possible to launch a public procurement procedure as a restricted procedure where there 
are two phases, the first serving the pre-screening and pre-selection of eligible bidders, and the 
second constituting the actual decision among the shortlisted bidders. Tailoring the eligibility 
and evaluation criteria to the benefit of a particular bidder is made easy by the detailed 
knowledge of shortlisted bidders remaining after the first phase. 
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Both slicing contracts and invoking special rules are regulated in the Public Procurement 
Law, making the application of this corruption technique difficult in principle. However, in 
practice, detection is difficult as the contracts are moved out of the more transparent domain 
and determining the actual joined-up nature of two or more contracts requires intimate 
knowledge of the contracts as well as the issuer (Piga 2011). As with many other techniques, 
external control is exercised by the SAO and supporting institutions especially the National 
Development Agency managing most of the EU funding coming into Hungary. Early surveys of 
practice confirm what our interviews underlined: external control is rare and not very effective 
(Major Dezsériné 2003). In the case of underestimating contract value, but still remaining 
under the umbrella of the Public Procurement Law, deviation between estimated and actual 
contract value can be observed. In these cases, the Public Procurement Arbitration Board may 
intervene and fine issuers. However, fines are incurred by issuers, whereas corruption fees 
accrue to the corrupt network making the fines a potentially weak instrument. 
There are wide ranging examples of circumventing the more stringent regulations of the 
Public Procurement Law both from Hungary and from abroad. In Hungary, it is very telling 
that practitioners simply call the restricted procedure (“meghívásos eljárás” in Hungarian) the 
“three bidder procedure” as one public procurement adviser working in the industry for over a 
decade put it: “just bring two friends with whom we can agree on the exact content of their 
bids”. In Italy, a “culture of emergency” has evolved in public procurement leading to “a 
systematic search for the exceptionality” and a frequent use of “mechanisms of arbitrary 
choice in public contracting” (Soreide 2002 p. 18). 
Due to the central position of this technique in relation to other techniques and the wide 
ranging ramifications of procedural regime choice to several aspects of public procurement, a 
large number of indicators are developed. We discuss three direct indicators:  
A) proportion of non-open procedures;  
B) average corruption risk score of procedures followed; and  
C) frequency of actual contract value above estimated contract value.  
We also discuss one indirect indicator:  
D) ratio of contract value according to Public Procurement Law over total procurement 
contract value. 
The frequency of using higher corruption risk procedure types signals in a simple and 
straightforward way the underlying corruption technique. Corruption risks indicated by the 
choice of procedural regime can be measured in a variety of ways. For example, a sophisticated 
econometric paper looking at corruption in public procurement in Paraguay uses the 
proportion of exceptional procedures over all other procedures (Auriol, Flochel, and Straub 
2011). In order to focus our indicator on the largest differences in corruption risks the 
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proposed simple measure of tinkering with procedural regimes takes open procedures as a 
benchmark: 
NOPRit = 1 – ( OPRit / TNPit  ) 
where NOPRit refers to the proportion of non-open procedures over all procedures concluded 
of the ith unit of observation such as public organisation or bidder over period t, OPRit refers 
to the number of procedures following open procedural regime of the ith unit of observation 
during period t, and TNPit refers to the total number of procedures concluded by the ith unit of 
observation over period t (Table 2). 
It is possible to rank procedure types according to level of transparency and degree of 
openness of competition prescribed. Hence procedure types could be ranked according to their 
corruption risks. Averaging the corruption risk ranks of procedures concluded may serve as a 
more subtle indicator of corruption than simply looking at the prevalence non-open 
procedures. By implication, the following indicator is proposed: 
ARPRit = ( Σj Rj * Nitj ) / TNPit 
where ARPRit refers to the average corruption rank of procedures leading to contract award by 
the ith unit of observation over period t (corruption rank takes a higher value for higher 
corruption risk procedure types), Rj refers to the corruption rank of the jth procedure type, Nitj 
denotes the number of procedures following the jth procedure type of the ith unit of 
observation during period t, and TNPit refers to the total number of procedures concluded by 
the ith unit of observation over period t. 
As Table 2 indicates these two variables tell a fairly similar story with slight differences. 
2010 experienced the lowest corruption risk according to these two indicators while there is a 
marked upward trend since then with a particularly strong increase in 2012 which at least 
partially reflect changes in the Public Procurement Law. 
Table 2.  
Mean proportion of non-open procedures and mean  
corruption rank of procedure types, 2009-2012 
Year 
Mean proportion 
of non-open 
procedures 
Mean corruption 
rank of procedure 
types 
N 
2009 0.4220 1.0635 10982 
2010 0.3259 0.9267 17769 
2011 0.3673 1.1959 14140 
2012 0.5733 1.2376 10372 
Total 0.4049 1.0869 53263 
Source: PP 
The underestimation of contract value can be observed simply by comparing estimated 
and actual contract values. While, some issuers may have indeed made an error in calculating 
estimated contract value, this is likely done on purpose when the ‘error’ allowed to switch 
procedure regime as interviewees pointed out. Hence, the suggested indicator is: 
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EVSPRit = NSWit / TNPit 
where EVSPRit refers to the proportion of tenders where manipulating estimated contract 
value resulted in switching procedure regime within all tenders of the ith unit of observation 
over period t, NSWit denotes the number of tenders where manipulating estimated contract 
value resulted in switching procedure regime of the ith unit of observation during period t, and 
TNTit refers to the total number of tenders concluded by the ith unit of observation over period 
t. 
While in a great number of cases, estimated contract values are missing, it is possible to 
explore the differences between actual and estimated contract values for over 29000 contracts 
throughout 2009-2012 (Figure 2). While for most contracts, actual contract value is lower or 
equal to estimated contract value, about 7-9% of observed contracts have a considerably 
higher actual than estimated contract value (we took 1 million HUF as a threshold for large 
enough difference). As more work is needed to precisely determine the thresholds for each 
observed contract, we simply took this 1 million HUF threshold as a rough indicator of 
potential corruption risks concerning the manipulation of estimated contract value. 
Figure 2.  
The scatter plot of actual (Y axis) and estimated contract values (X axis),  
2009-2012, million HUF  
(only contracts of less than 2 billion HUF are depicted) 
 
Source: PP 
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Even though there is no contract-level detailed data on public procurement contracts 
outside the remit of the Public Procurement Law, it is possible to construct an estimate of total 
procurement for each public organisation using annual budget figures reported to the 
Treasury (Audet 2002; European Commission 2011). As avoiding the transparency and 
competition requirements set by the Public Procurement Law can be a powerful motivating 
factor for corrupt actors, comparing the contracted value according to the law to the total 
contracted value can signal the magnitude of these corrupt efforts. As contracting outside the 
Public Procurement Law can result from a range of non-corrupt reasons, only large gaps 
between the two types of contracting may actually signal this corruption technique. 
Nevertheless, we propose an indicator capturing the full scale of gaps leaving validation of 
different parts of the scale to later multivariate analysis: 
NPPit = 1 – ( PPVit / TPVit ) 
where NPPit refers to the proportion of contract value not according to the Public Procurement 
Law within the total procurement spending of the ith unit of observation, typically public 
organisation, over period t, PPVit denotes the total value of contracts awarded according to the 
Public Procurement Law of the ith unit of observation during period t, and TPVit refers to the 
total procurement spending of the ith unit of observation over period t. As we dispose of more 
detailed budget figures than previous studies (Audet 2002; European Commission 2011), we 
calculated total procurement as the sum of material expenses and investment expenses 
accrued in a given period. 
Even though, we cannot yet present the full picture of the Hungarian public 
administration, data on central public organisations are already highly illuminating. It appears 
that on average close to 80% of procurement spending takes place outside the Public 
Procurement Law’s remit throughout 2009-2011 (Figure 3). In addition, this proportion has 
increased from 75% In 2009 to 81% in 2011. This raises the concern that the analysis of PP 
data only looks at the “tip of the iceberg”. 
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Figure 3.  
Percentage of procurement spending not according  
to the Public Procurement Law, 2009-2011, N=631 issuer  
(the same issuer counts as multiple observations across the years) 
 
Source: PP 
While there is no specific indicator developed based on the breaks in distributions of 
contract values around thresholds and after changes in thresholds, it is suggested that a more 
detailed analysis of contract value distributions could lead to additional insights as to how 
issuers may game the system of procedure regimes and the corresponding thresholds. 
T2.2 Tailoring eligibility criteria 
Eligibility criteria define which potential bidders can bid and which bids can be considered for 
competition. That is, both bidders and their bids should meet a set of criteria in order to be 
considered for a tender. Hence, tailoring eligibility criteria to exclude most or all non-wanted 
bidders even though they could bid given the actual object of procurement can effectively 
inhibit fair competition. This is by far the most widely quoted corruption technique in the 
Hungarian (Báger 2011; Major Dezsériné 2003; Pálinkó, Szántó, and Tóth 2008; Papanek 
2009) and international literature (Goldman, So, and Rocholl 2012; Grodeland 2005, 2010; 
Heggstad and Froystad 2011; Piga 2011; Soreide 2006) which was confirmed by our 
interviewees. Tailoring can be done by 
1. defining a combination of hard criteria such as prior works or annual turnover clearly 
excluding some companies, or  
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2. setting vague and subjective criteria allowing issuers to exercise discretion in a partial 
manner.  
Once, only the desired bidder remains as eligible bidder, it can submit a price 
considerably above market price earning a rent (OECD 2007; Transparency International 
2006). Naturally, some criteria are justified as they aid sorting out capable bidders and bids; 
what makes them more than simple reasonable pre-screening is their excessive amount and 
overly restrictive nature in the light of the procured goods and services. 
Consistently differentiating reasonable and excessive criteria, i.e. limiting the applicability of 
this technique, is difficult and requires robust case law and uniformly applied rules. In 
Hungary, there are several decisions of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board on this 
issue; however, according to interviewees, legal uncertainty is high as the very same issue 
could be judged differently by different judges. Nevertheless, due to potential judicial 
challenge, this technique may only result in limiting the list of bidders rather than eliminating 
all but one. In a next step, involving other techniques, the list can be shrank further. 
The most intimately linked corruption technique designed to further shrink the list of 
eligible bidders and bids is T2.3-abusing formal and administrative requirements. Once 
complicated and difficult to meet set of criteria is defined, it is relatively easy for the issuer to 
find at least one requirement which was not appropriately documented. This provides 
sufficient grounds for the issuer to exclude bidders and their bids. Furthermore, corruption 
technique T1.2 (defining needs to benefit a particular supplier) neatly supports this corruption 
technique as eligibility criteria should, in principle, follow from organisational needs and the 
characteristics of goods and services to be procured. Biased needs estimation makes biased 
criteria setting more easily defensible at court. 
Interviewees in Hungary frequently shared concrete examples demonstrating the abuse 
of the system of references (i.e. proof of prior experience). One large construction company 
was excluded from a tender for building a hospital on the grounds that they had no specific 
experience with building a lone-standing morgue even though they had built hospitals with a 
morgue. As lone-standing and within hospital morgues have essentially the same technical 
parameters this criteria was likely used to exclude unwanted bidders. The respondent knew 
which 3 companies had specific experience with building lone-standing morgues. Other 
suspicious eligibility criteria made it clear to this company that the process was ‘set-up’ right 
from the beginning.  
Other frequently quoted examples relate to detailed financial criteria (financial 
information on large companies is public so it is easy to tailor criteria to the detriment of 
unwanted bidders). A public procurement advisor gave an example: “During a public car 
purchase procedure, the company was excluded because there was a condition specified 
requiring bidders to have higher own capital than subscribed capital. The company couldn’t 
28 
 
meet this criterion due to an ongoing investment (subscribed capital: 125 billion HUF, own 
capital: 124.7 billion HUF). Instead an XY ‘phantom’ company11 won the tender.” (Papanek 
2009 p. 239). 
There is one direct indicator associated with this corruption technique: 
A) length of eligibility criteria. 
Length and complexity of eligibility criteria both for bidders and bids provides a crude 
measure of the use of this technique especially when taking into consideration the size of the 
contract too (i.e. bigger contracts may require more lengthy and complex system of criteria for 
valid reasons). As looking at the use of specific ‘suspicious’ criteria was not made possible by 
our limited understanding and diverse nature of these ‘suspicious’ criteria12, we propose the 
following crude measure: 
ADLECit =  Σjk ( LECitjk - ALECk ) / Nit 
where ADLECit denotes the average difference in the length of eligibility criteria between the 
call for tenders of the ith unit of observation such as issuer over period t and the average 
length at the kth market over period t, LECitjk refers to length of eligibility criteria of the jth call 
for tenders of ith unit of observation belonging to the kth market during period t, ALECk 
denotes the average length of eligibility criteria during the whole observation period for the 
kth market, and Nit refers to the number of calls for tenders of ith unit of observation during 
period t. Public procurement markets are taken as reference groups recognising that more 
lengthy and complex criteria is justified for specific markets. Unfortunately, if a market is 
dominated by excessively complicated and lengthy eligibility criteria due to the large number 
of corrupt procedures this normalisation will lead to an underestimation of corruption risks. 
Length of criteria is simply measured as the number of characters used. 
The average length of eligibility criteria in each public procurement market as defined by 
CPV13 main divisions varied between 4400 characters in the market of printed matter and 
related products (CPV division 22) to 9700 characters in the market of Services related to the 
oil and gas industry (CPV division 76). These differences probably reflect the variation in the 
complexity of these markets and potentially the differences in average contract size too. The 
deviation from the market average follows a somewhat skewed distribution (Figure 4). Even 
though the deviation from the market averages is weakly correlated with contract size 
(r2=0.28) indicating that contract size may play role in the complexity of criteria, a version of 
                                               
11 Phantom company in ordinary Hungarian language (fantomcég) typically refers to a company created 
specifically for corrupt or tax evasion purposes having very little economic activity other than related to 
rent extraction. 
12 More work is under way to develop better direct measure of complexity and restrictiveness as the 
complete text of criteria is available to us for every call for tenders. We will combine additional interview 
examples of frequently used ‘suspicious’ criteria and text mining methods. 
13 CPV=Common Procurement Vocabulary. For more info see: http://simap.europa.eu/codes-and-
nomenclatures/codes-cpv/codes-cpv_en.htm  
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this indicator based on deviations from market and contract size group averages carries little 
extra information (the two versions are highly correlated r2=0.97). 
Figure 4.  
Average difference in the length of eligibility criteria between the call for tenders 
and its market mean, number of characters, 2009-2012 
 
Source: PP 
T2.3 Abusing formal and administrative requirements 
Public procurement bids easily encompass several hundred pages of documentation especially 
in case of large tenders. Each bid has to comply with formal and administrative requirements 
such as the format of the budget or the provision of original documents from public bodies 
(e.g. registration at the court registry). While these requirements are desirable in general, their 
large number and complexity provide ample opportunities for abuse. According to our 
interviews as well as the international literature, it is practically always possible to find a 
formal or administrative error which provides grounds for excluding the bid from competition 
(Báger 2011; Grodeland 2005; Papanek 2009; Transparency International 2006). Hence, this 
corruption technique abuses minor technical errors to serve the interests of corrupt networks 
by allowing them to limit competition to their preferred bidders. Excluding bids on formal and 
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administrative grounds is a legitimate activity, but it becomes cause for suspicion once it 
becomes excessive, inconsistently applied, and regularly leads to only one remaining bid. 
In principle, the prescribed opportunity for bidders to correct such errors after 
submitting their bids limit the applicability of this technique. However, in Hungary, the 
procedure of requesting and submitting corrections is largely unregulated. This means that 
corrupt issuers comply with the law only formally, but not substantially: as a public 
procurement advisor working in the construction industry for over a decade put it: “it is easy, 
you request on Friday 13 o’clock the original copy of any minor document bearing a public 
agency’s stamp on it to be submitted by Monday 10h. It all looks fine, you left three days for 
correction, but in fact you made it impossible.” Another surprising sign of the frequency of this 
technique is that one of its specific versions acquired its own expression in public procurement 
‘slang’: “exhaustion technique”. According to a Public Procurement Lawyer active in a range of 
sectors for several years this term means that “unwanted bidders are requested to submit 
corrections in several turns until they finally understand that there is no point in trying, they 
won’t ever win the contract they bid for.”14 According to our interviews, it seems that this 
technique is one of the new ‘hype’ techniques in Hungary due to the ease of its applicability 
(i.e. lack of regulation). 
A concrete example quoted by one interviewee concerned a procurement procedure for a 
garden reconstruction project where the company was excluded on the grounds that its 
submitted budget was not complete. It was deemed incomplete because the price of grass seed 
was not explicitly highlighted as a separate line in the proposed budget even though it was 
included in the total budget for lawn installation costs. Challenging this decision at the Public 
Procurement Arbitration Board did not change the situation either in spite of prior court 
decisions annulling the decision of issuers in analogous situations. 
This technique is closely related to technique T2.2-tailoring eligibility criteria as both stem 
from the complexity and length of the defined eligibility criteria. Moreover, this technique 
neatly works together with other techniques aiming at reducing competition. For example, 
tailoring needs and eligibility criteria could get the number of bidders down to 3-5 while 
formal and administrative reasons could remove the remaining unwanted bidders from the 
competition. If this would not lead to only one bidder, manipulation of evaluation criteria 
could still leave ample room for discretionary choice of preferred bidder. 
Due to the close association between this and the previous techniques (T2.2), one 
proposed indicator is the same for them. There are two direct measures: 
A) proportion of excluded bids, and  
B) length of eligibility criteria. 
                                               
14 The „exhaustion technique” sometimes also includes periods of Public Procurement Arbitration Board 
intervention once again with the same message to unwanted bidders: give it up, no matter how hard you 
try, in the end we will find the right legal form for excluding you.  
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The proportion of valid bids within all received bids can be considered as a direct 
measure of this corruption technique as it allows for directly gauging how excessively certain 
issuers or on certain markets exclusions of received bids is exercised. Hence, the proposed 
indicator is 
PERBit = ( NRBit - NVBit ) / NRBit 
where PERBit refers to the proportion of excluded bids over all received bids of the ith unit of 
observation (typically public organisation) over period t, NRBit refers to the total number of 
received bids by the ith unit of observation over period t , and NVBit denotes the total number 
of valid bids of the ith unit of observation during period t. 
The distribution of contract award notices according to the percentage of excluded bids 
displays particular spikes at 33%, 50% and 66% which reflect the most typical situations 
whereby one out of three, one out of two, and two out of three received bids are excluded 
(Figure 5). Overall, 83% of all contract award notices exclude no bidder and about 5% of them 
exclude all the bidders. This measure may not adequately reflect reality as recording valid bids 
is not sufficiently standardized in contract award announcements.15 
Figure 5.  
Percentage of excluded bids, 2009-2011 (restricted sample: those contract award 
notes which excluded at least one bidder, but not all of them) 
 
Source: PP 
                                               
15 Due to frequent unstructured reporting of valid bids and bidders, this indicator is still not final for 
2009-2011 and 2012 data is only partially collected.  
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Complexity and length of eligibility criteria defines the pool of items from which formal 
and administrative requirements can be chosen for arbitrary application and abuse. Hence, 
the previously discussed indicator of length also serves as a suitable measure for this 
technique. 
T2.4 Tailoring assessment criteria 
Assessment criteria are crucial in deciding to which bidder to award the contract among those 
bidders who jumped the eligibility hurdle. Issuers can generally decide between price-only and 
price plus quality criteria. If they choose price plus quality there is a range of possible quality 
criteria which are more or less objectively measurable. By deliberately choosing those 
assessment criteria which are hard to objectively measure such as quality of organigram, 
issuers can grant themselves considerable discretion raising corruption risks (Lengwiler and 
Wolfstetter 2006; OECD 2007; Piga 2011; Transparency International 2006; World Bank 
2007). However, not all quality criteria are subjective, for example speed of completion, 
amount of indemnity, or payment deadline can be objectively assessed. In addition, there are 
markets such as IT where the standard is competition based on system performance while 
price is fixed. 
Even though the Public Procurement Law defines the range of permissible evaluation 
criteria, there is still a broad arsenal from which corrupt networks can choose lawfully making 
effective external control difficult. 
As mentioned earlier, this corruption technique may be used in tandem with other 
techniques limiting the range of eligible bidders. It can also serve as a substitute for excluding 
bidders, that is if exclusion efforts were not successful or were deemed too risky, subjective 
evaluation criteria can still ‘do the job’. Postulating subjective evaluation criteria can only 
serve a corrupt purpose if the corrupt network manages to control the subjective scoring 
mechanism too. Hence, corruption technique T4.3-unfair scoring is essential for the success of 
this technique. 
There are two proposed direct indicators for this corruption technique: 
A) length of assessment criteria, and  
B) weight of non-price criteria. 
The length of assessment criteria serves as a proxy for the overall complexity of criteria. 
We consider more complex set of criteria as more difficult to check by external actors and 
giving more discretion to the decision maker hence involving higher corruption risks. 
Following a similar logic to eligibility criteria length (T2.2), the following indicator is 
calculated: 
ADACLit = Σjk ( LACitjk - AACk ) / Nit 
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where ADALCit denotes the average difference in the length of assessment criteria between the 
call for tenders of the ith unit of observation such as issuer over period t and the average 
length at the kth market over period t, LACitjk refers to length of assessment criteria of the jth 
call for tenders of ith unit of observation belonging to the kth market during period t, AACk 
denotes the average length of assessment criteria during the whole observation period at the 
kth market, and Nit refers to the number of calls for tenders of ith unit of observation during 
period t. Public procurement markets are taken as reference groups recognising that more 
lengthy and complex criteria are justified for specific markets.  In order to improve precision 
compared to the eligibility criteria length indicator where we only took the number of 
characters, here we use the number of assessment criteria rather than their number of 
characters (Figure 6). Nevertheless, the two versions of assessment criteria length are highly 
correlated: r2=0.88. Similar to the length of eligibility criteria, the number of assessment 
criteria correlates only very weakly with contract size (r2=0.27) suggesting that there is no 
need to take into account contract size beyond market when defining group means. 
Figure 6.  
Average difference in the length of assessment criteria between the call for 
tenders and its market mean, number of criteria (items), 2009-2012 
 
Source: PP 
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The overall weight of subjective criteria compared to objective criteria may directly relate 
to corruption risks as it indicates the room for subjective judgement within the whole scoring 
process. It is easy to see that price is an objective criteria; however, quantitative indicators of 
quality such as completion deadline, while seem to be objective, may in fact signal corruption 
risks. Some argue that putting objective criteria into the evaluation criteria instead of keeping 
them among the eligibility criteria in itself signals corruption risks (Oživení 2011). However, 
our interviews point at the corruption risks of subjective quality criteria such as organigram. 
As more research is needed to resolve this controversy and to come up with a close to complete 
list of objective quality criteria16, we only consider the relative importance of price versus non-
price criteria. There are two possible formulations of this: first, a straightforward measure 
relates to whether price is the only criteria or whether other criteria also a matter; second, it is 
possible to calculate the relative weight of price-related criteria among all listed criteria using a 
keyword search. The first formulation is the following: 
PPPAit = NPPAit / Nit  
where PPPAit, refers to the proportion calls for tenders with price plus quality assessment over 
all calls for tenders of the ith unit of observation such as issuer over period t (tenders are 
either price-only or price plus quality), NPPAitj denotes the number of calls for tenders with 
price plus quality assessment criteria of ith unit of observation during period t, and Nit refers 
to the number of calls for tenders of ith unit of observation during period t. This indicator 
follows a declining trend with a peak in 2010 (the year of national elections) (Table 3) as well 
as having marked differences across public procurement markets throughout the whole period 
average proportion ranging from 4% to 93%. As these cross market differences may very well 
be related to differences in technology rather than only corruption, this indicator shall be used 
with greater than usual care (for discussion of the IT sector see the beginning of this, T2.4, 
section).  
Table 3.  
Proportion of tenders with price-plus assessment criteria, 2009-2012 
Year Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
2009 0.48 10982 0.50 
2010 0.54 17769 0.50 
2011 0.38 14140 0.48 
2012 0.30 10372 0.46 
2009-
2012 
0.44 53263 0.50 
Source: PP 
                                               
16 Once the list is completed text mining techniques quickly allow for identifying the weight of the 
individual objective and subjective elements in calls for tenders. 
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While the first formulation of the weight of non-price criteria is more reliably extracted 
from announcements, the second version is more fine-grained albeit with the possible error or 
missing price-related elements. This measure is the following: 
AWNPACit = Σj WNPACitj / Nit  
where AWNPACit, refers to the average combined weight of non-price related assessment 
criteria in calls for tenders of the ith unit of observation such as issuer over period t, WNPACitj 
denotes the weight of non-price related assessment criteria in the jth call for tenders of ith unit 
of observation during period t., and Nit refers to the number of calls for tenders of ith unit of 
observation during period t. This indicator falls between 0 and 1, where 1 means high average 
combined weight of non-price related assessment criteria indicating higher corruption risks. 
There are a few procedures and contracts which almost exclusively rely on non-price 
assessment criteria (Figure 7). 
Figure 7.  
Frequency distribution of awarded contracts according to the combined weight 
of non-price related assessment criteria, 2009-2012 
 
Source: PP 
T2.5 Using a long term complex contract 
There is theoretical as well as empirical evidence that the length of collaboration is positively 
related to corruption risks (Coviello and Gagliarducci 2010). In addition, complex contracts 
involving many unforeseeable events and a range of options such as public-private 
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partnerships (PPP) or framework contracts are harder to control (Báger 2011). Hence, the 
overall weight of such contracts in the public procurement portfolio of an issuer may signal 
mid to long term corruption risks. Central purchasing bodies’ framework contracts may reduce 
corruption risks for smaller entities buying through the central framework (Bandiera, Prat, 
and Valletti 2009); but framework agreements awarded, especially those with only one bidder 
in the framework, may represent a considerable corruption risk as some of our interviewees 
pointed out. 
In principle, the competitive award of such long term complex contracts assures 
sufficient control; however, the lack of pre-determined purchased quantities allow for specific 
forms of collecting corruption rent. For example, in the case of framework contracts, bidders 
obtaining a framework agreement have to specify the unit price of each product or service 
potentially procured within the framework. Framework contracts are awarded on the basis of 
some hypothetical quantity of each product and service which can substantially deviate from 
the actual purchases. Then it is enough for the issuer to informally tell the preferred bidder 
which products will actually be procured in large quantities so that this bidder can set prices 
that look the cheapest when considering a hypothetical quantity set, but allows for extra profit 
in the case of actual quantities. 
The problematic nature of such contracts, especially PPPs, may be signalled by several large-
value investments ending in years of court proceedings and intense fights between private 
companies and the government right after a new government enters into power (e.g. 
Közraktárak redevelopment in Budapest). 
The use of this corruption technique is potentially linked to all the other techniques 
limiting competition for contracts as it increases payoffs for corruption due to the long term 
and high value character of the contracts. 
There are two direct indicators of this corruption technique which should be interpreted in the 
context of other corruption risk indicators: 
A) combined value of framework contracts and PPPs per total contract value,  
B) average contract duration. 
The combined value of framework contracts (actual money spent as opposed to the value 
of the framework agreement) and PPPs compared to the total contract value of an issuer or 
market directly measures the potential for this kind of corruption technique to arise. The 
simple metrics we propose is: 
PLCCit = LCCVit / PPVit 
where PLCCit refers to the proportion of total combined value of long term complex contracts 
(i.e. framework agreements and PPPs) within the total public procurement contract value of 
the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over period t, LCCVit denotes the total 
combined value of long term complex contracts of the ith unit of observation during period t, 
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and PPVit denotes the total value of contracts awarded according to the Public Procurement 
Law by the ith unit of observation during period t. 
Throughout 2009-2012, 97% of Hungarian issuers has not issued a single contract as 
part of a framework agreement or public-private partnership. However, those issuers which 
have awarded at least one such contract typically have done so in a large proportion of their 
total public procurement spending (more than 44%) (Figure 8). 
Figure 8.  
Percentage of public procurement contract value of PPP and framework 
contracts within total public procurement contract value, 2009-2012  
(only those issuers which have at least one PPP or framework contract) 
 
Source: PP 
Average contract duration provides an alternative indicator for this corruption 
technique. It is superior to the previous one in the sense that it considers all the contracts 
awarded rather than the subset of highly complex and long-term contracts. Following a similar 
logic to that of eligibility and assessment criteria, we normed contract length with market 
average as different technologies imply different reasonable contract lengths. The proposed 
metrics is: 
ADCDit =  Σjk ( CDitjk - ACDk ) / TNCit 
where ADCDit denotes the average difference in contract duration between the call for tenders 
of the ith unit of observation such as issuer over period t and the average contract duration at 
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the kth market over period t, CDitjk denotes the contract duration of the jth contract awarded 
by the ith unit of observation belonging to the kth market during period t, ACDk denotes the 
average contract duration during the whole observation period for the kth market, and TNCit 
refers to the total number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation during period t. 
The limit of applicability for this metric is that contract duration is often unreliably disclosed 
in announcements. 
Unfortunately, we could not gather data on the length of all the contracts awarded, first 
because some are of unlimited length; second, some others don’t disclose any information on 
length even though we have reasons to suspect that they are of limited length17. There are 
about than 31 000 contracts where we have sufficient data on contract length (either from calls 
for tenders, contract award announcements or contract completion announcements). These 
reveal that the overwhelming majority of contracts cluster around the mean of their markets 
while a small number of contracts are considerably longer going up to 33 years ‘excess’ 
duration (Figure 9). This accentuates how atypical PPP-s, framework contracts, and other long 
term contracts are in general. 
Figure 9. 
Contract length in years (normed by market average), contracts awarded in 
2009-2012 (only contracts shorter than 10 years) 
 
Source: PP 
                                               
17 Contract length is either given in the contract award notice where there is an explicit requirement for 
publishing it, but unfortunately the relevant fields often remain empty. A further piece of the puzzle we 
could make use of is the contract completion announcement which allows for gauging the actual rather 
than the planned contract length. 
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T2.6 Tinkering with the submission period 
Submission periods, that is the time period between the publication of call for tenders and the 
deadline for submitting the bids, in Hungary and most EU countries, are tightly regulated for 
some procedure types while largely unregulated for others. Regulation typically implies 
postulating minimum submission periods for some procedure types, for example 45 days for 
open procedure above EU threshold under normal circumstances. Submission periods 
constitute a useful tool for limiting competition, as leaving too little time for preparing bids 
can effectively exclude bidders (Kenny and Musatova 2010; OECD 2007). An impossibly short 
submission period such as one day combined with early information provision to the ‘desired’ 
winner (T3.1 - selective information provision), so that it can start preparing before the 
publication of call for tenders, constitutes a highly effective way of excluding unwanted 
bidders. Limiting competition to that bidder, which is part of the corrupt network, allows for 
collecting rents. Some of the short deadlines are obviously due to non-corrupt reasons such as 
issuers who are under time pressure trying to rush through a procedure in order to complete a 
project on time. While this can happen in some cases to some issuers, regular occurrences of 
such procedures and extremely short deadlines may indeed signal deliberate attempts to abuse 
the system of submission periods. 
Checking whether the submission periods comply with legal requirements appears to be 
somewhat effective when the call for tenders is published in the Public Procurement Bulletin18. 
The Public Procurement Authority particularly heavily concentrates on compliance in this 
area, and the media often picks up some of the extreme stories. General compliance with legal 
requirements was confirmed by interviewees as well as inspection of time series data in 
Hungary, but internationally too (Fazekas and Tóth 2012b; Oživení 2011). Hence, it is 
expected that extremely short deadlines would appear only for procedure types where little or 
no regulation exists and by invoking special reasons for accelerated procedures where heavy 
regulation exists. However, procedures where the call for tenders has only been published on 
the homepage of the issuer or hasn’t been published at all are expected to have extremely short 
submission periods more often. 
This corruption technique is closely associated with a number of others. First, as already 
mentioned T3.1 - selective information provision constitutes its very crucial ‘tandem’ partner 
                                               
18 According to a ‘test announcement’ recorded by one large issuer in Budapest in collaboration with the 
authors, there is no automatic control on submission deadlines in the online system of announcement 
submission. Hence, control relies exclusively on controllers of the Public Procurement Authority 
spotting the shorter than legal deadlines which has not been 100% accurate as our statistical evidence 
points out (see below for more details). 
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for putting the desired bidder in advantage over other bidders. Second, as procedure type 
defines the minimum length of submission period, the success of tinkering with thresholds 
and exceptions (T2.1) is a powerful determinant of the availability of this technique. Third, 
avoiding publication of call for tenders (T3.2) beyond greatly diminishing transparency also 
allows for unaccountable use of deadlines (i.e. it is difficult to check whether the submission 
period was reasonable). 
A telling example of how widespread this technique was shared by one large procurer: “A 
fairly small procurement need – about 4 million HUF (14 thousand EUR) -  arose in the 
organisation which had to be met swiftly. We sent out direct invitations with a one day 
submission period to the four major players of the market whom we knew from previous 
purchases. Neither of them even replied to the call. We enquired their reasons over the phone 
and 3 out of 4 said that they interpreted the invitation as ‘set-up’, that is they were needed to 
mimic competition whereas the winner is already decided.” Another example widely covered 
by Hungarian media left four days of weekend plus national holidays for bidders to submit 
their bids for a 716 million HUF (2.5 million EUR) creative communications and PR tender19. 
This case has even resulted in a court proceeding in which the final decision is still pending; 
however the contract has been signed and delivery commenced so any court decision is 
unlikely to interrupt the suspicious deal. 
We propose three direct indicators each measuring the same technique from a slightly 
different angle: 
A) proportion of tenders with accelerated submission periods within all procedures, 
B) proportion of tenders with extremely short submission periods within all procedures, 
and 
C) average contract value per weekday available for submission. 
As Hungarian law allows for accelerating procedures (i.e. shortening submission 
periods), a direct indication of circumventing regulations of submission periods is the 
frequency or regularity of accelerated procedures. The legal framework determining 
acceleration rules and the minimum number of days has been intricately complex and has 
changed frequently. Hence, a simple approach was taken reflecting both general rules of 
accelerated procedures and the empirical distributions of submission periods (cut-points can 
be found in Table 4). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
19 For the original call for tenders: 
http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/adatbazis/mutat/hirdetmeny/portal_12337_2012/ and the contract 
award notice: http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/adatbazis/mutat/hirdetmeny/portal_14257_2012/  
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Table 4. 
Submission period thresholds under which a procedure is  
deemed to be accelerated, 2009-2012 
year/ procedure type missing open invitation negotiation other 
2009 22 22 14 22 22 
2010 22 22 14 22 22 
2011 18 18 14 18 18 
2012 18 18 14 18 18 
 
As acceleration is typically granted on the basis of urgency and extraordinary 
circumstances this indicator also signals to what degree the exception is the norm. Regularly 
invoking exceptional circumstances for increasing discretion is another aspect of corruption 
frequently quoted in the literature (Ionita et al. 2011). Hence, we suggest the following 
indicator: 
 PSSTit = NSSPit / TNTit 
where PSSPit refers to the proportion of accelerated tenders with shortened submission 
periods over all tenders concluded of the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, 
over period t, NSSPit denotes the total number of accelerated tenders with shortened 
submission periods of the ith unit of observation during period t, and TNTit refers to the total 
number of tenders concluded by the ith unit of observation over period t. 
There is a marked upward trend in the proportion of accelerated public procurement 
procedures throughout 2009-2012 (Figure 10). By 2012, almost one third of all procedures for 
which we have data have been accelerated, that is used a shorter than ‘normal’ submission 
period. 
Figure 10.  
Percentage of procedures with accelerated and extremely  
short submission periods, 2009-2012, % 
 
Source: PP 
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An indicator even more heavily concentrating on extreme cases in order to indicate 
unusually high corruption risks is the proportion of extremely short submission deadlines 
such as the one highlighted in the example above (4 days). While it is difficult to determine 
precisely how long an extremely short submission period is, we made use of the lowest legally 
permissible deadlines as benchmarks as well as identified the lower end of the empirical 
submission period distributions where frequency drops sharply as an indication that 
something unusual is happening throughout 2009-2012 (Figure 10 and Figure 11). As a result 
we employed a uniform 15 days threshold for 2009-2010 and 13 days threshold for 2011-2012. 
The following indicator is proposed: 
PESSTit = NESSPit / TNTit 
where PESSPit refers to the proportion of tenders with extremely short submission periods 
over all procedures concluded of the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over 
period t, NESSPit denotes the total number of procedures with extremely short submission 
periods of the ith unit of observation during period t, and TNTit refers to the total number of 
tenders concluded by the ith unit of observation over period t.  
The distributions of submission periods changed considerably between 2009-2010 and 
2011-2012, the spike at day 22 in 2010 moved down to day 18 in 2011 largely due to the 
shortening of official minimum thresholds in the Public Procurement Law (Figure 11). Large 
differences across procedure types have remained consistent (e.g. non-open procedures have 
much shorter submission periods on average) even though the relative frequencies of each 
type change from year to year. Importantly, extremely short submission periods appear 
recurrently in each year and procedure type as evidenced by the sharp drop in the number of 
cases below the threshold of 15-13 days even though these short submission periods are not 
permitted even under exceptional situations. Across every procedure type, the proportion of 
procedures with extremely short submission periods are rare amounting to about 3-5% 
throughout 2009-2012 (Figure 10). 
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Figure 11.  
Distribution of contract award notices’ submission periods,  
open procedures, 2010 and 2011, days (<65 days) 
 
Source: PP 
In order to more broadly gauge the handling of submission periods we also look at the 
average submission period length normed by contract size. Norming by contract size 
recognises that larger projects generally need longer submission periods due to legal 
constraints, but also that having extremely short submission period for large contracts 
represents higher corruption risk than the same submission period for a smaller contract. In 
order to better reflect the actual time available for bidder preparing for a tender, we took the 
number of weekdays as a reference rather than calendar days as prescribed in the Public 
Procurement Law. Hence, the indicator is: 
ASPVit = ( Σj ( CVitj / SPitj )) / TNTit 
where ASPVit refers to the average contract value per number of weekdays available for 
submission for the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over period t, SPit 
denotes the number of week days available for submission in the jth procedure of the ith unit 
of observation during period t, CVit refers to the contract value of the jth procedure by the ith 
unit of observation over period t, and TNTit refers to the total number of tenders concluded by 
the ith unit of observation over period t. This indicator cannot be treated as a continuous 
measure of corruption risks. Rather, its high values indicate unusually high corruption risks 
and middle and low values convey very little as to the level of corruption risks involved.  
On average, this ratio almost reaches 5 throughout 2009-2012 that is, there were almost 
5 million HUF of contract value for each weekday of submission period. It is noteworthy that 
the distribution of this ratio is highly skewed with only few very large numbers (Figure 12). As 
submission periods may also reflect differences in technology and industry standards, it is 
conceivable that norming by market means leads to a better indicator.  
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Figure 12.  
The distribution of average contract value (million HUF)  
per submission period (week days), 2009-2012 (ratios < 50) 
 
Source: PP 
4.3 Document preparation and dissemination 
T3.1 Selective information provision 
Communication between bidders and issuers is heavily regulated in Hungary as well as in EU 
member states because it can have a decisive impact on competition (Soreide 2006). Getting 
more, better quality, or more timely information on tenders can put some bidders in an 
unbeatable position. This is exactly what corrupt informal networks use to win public 
contracts in seemingly fair competition in Hungary, but in other countries too (Goldman, So, 
and Rocholl 2012; Grodeland 2010; Papanek 2009; Piga 2011). It is enough to give informally 
crucial information on specific aspects of the tender to one bidder while issuing a vague or 
erroneous tender specification. The use of this corruption technique infringes on the principle 
of fair competition as well as transparency.  
There is little effective external control on any of these information flows as it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to monitor informal talks and information transmission through 
intermediaries. Several of our interviewees confirmed that there are informal talks putting the 
well-connected bidders in an advantageous position in Hungary rather frequently. 
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This technique is related to the choice of procedure type (T2.1) as less transparent 
procedure types such as negotiation make it very easy to provide information to one bidder 
while concealing it from other bidders. Furthermore, T2.7-tinkering with submission period 
works neatly in tandem with this technique as early informal ‘warning’ of the preferred bidder 
of a future call for tenders with very short submission deadline gives it a decisive competitive 
advantage (e.g. in extreme cases it can be the only one actually able to put together a valid 
bid). 
A construction company’s public procurement manager gave the example in an interview 
where there were two sets of tender documents: one for the official tender documentation and 
another one for the “friendly bidder” (in Hungarian: “csókos pályázó”). As a result, the 
“friendly bidder” was at a great advantage over all other bidders in terms of more accurate and 
detailed tendering information. 
Due to the high level of secrecy and lack of any direct record of unfair information 
provision there is no direct indicator. The use of extremely short submission periods, which 
make it impossible to put together a bid on time without prior information, can indirectly 
signal the use of this corruption technique. Hence, the two indirect indicators: 
A) proportion of tenders with extremely short submission periods within all procedures; 
and 
B) proportion of procedures with call for tenders modified within all procedures. 
The first indicator is likely able to signal only a particular type of corruption dealing (i.e. 
prior information provision) rather than all types falling under the umbrella of this corruption 
technique (e.g. better quality information provided to the pre-selected bidder). For detailed 
discussion of this indicator see section T2.6. 
For the second indirect indicator relating to modifications of call for tenders, we adopt the 
following formula: 
PMCit = NMCit / TNTit 
where PMCit refers to the proportion of procedures with modified call for tenders within all 
procedures concluded of the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over period 
t, NMCit denotes the total number of procedures with modified call for tenders of the ith unit 
of observation during period t, and TNTit refers to the total number of tenders concluded by 
the ith unit of observation over period t. While this broad indicator certainly encompasses 
simple administrative error as well as deliberate corruption, later statistical analyses linking it 
to corrupt outcomes on organisational or market level can provide the necessary insights to 
refine it if needed. If this approach turns out to be too broad, more fine-tuned indicators of 1) 
only looking at modifications of eligibility and/or assessment criteria after the deadline for 
obtaining tender documentation passed; 2) only considering those modifications which move 
submission deadlines forward, and 3) only looking at recurrent modifications to the same call 
46 
 
for tenders may prove to be valuable although there are very few calls for tender with multiple 
modifications. 
Modifications of calls for tenders follows a distinctive pattern over time with 2010 and 
2011 seeing the highest proportion of modifications (6% and 5% respectively) (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.  
Average proportion of contracts awarded whose call  
for tender was modified, 2009-2012 
 
Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
2009 0.026 1874 0.158 
2010 0.055 6553 0.228 
2011 0.049 3502 0.216 
2012 0.009 331 0.095 
2009-2012 0.048 12260 0.213 
Source: PP 
T3.2 Avoiding the publication of call for tenders 
The publication of call for tenders can take place at various places or can be avoided 
altogether. The most transparent place for publication is the Official Journal of the European 
Union or the Hungarian Public Procurement Bulletin which can guarantee the highest number 
of potential bidders informed about the tender (e.g. there are for-profit providers who recycle 
and disseminate procurement notices to potential bidders20). If issuers decide to only publish 
the call for tenders on their homepage it still can be considered as transparent, but 
considerably less as potential bidders may find it harder to monitor hundreds of individual 
homepages as opposed to one national page of public procurement. In the case when no call 
for tender is published at all, but instead it is sent to selected bidders the principle of 
transparency is violated the most extensively. While the choice of publication organ is 
regulated by the Public Procurement Law, which requires publication in the Public 
Procurement Bulletin in the case of large tenders, issuers can effectively choose the place of 
publication in a great number of cases21. If choice is exercised in favour of less transparency, 
leading to lower number of bidders, it can be suspected that the issuer may have something to 
hide, thus raising corruption risks (Heggstad and Froystad 2011; Lengwiler and Wolfstetter 
2006; OECD 2007; Ware et al. 2007).  
                                               
20 For example: www.tender-ertesito.hu  
21 In fact, the crosstabulation of procedure type and call for tenders published in the official journal 
reveals that a great many call for tenders are published in the Public Procurement Bulletin even though 
no regulation prescribes it. On the other hand, there are many procedures whereby the call for tenders 
should have been published in the Bulletin still it cannot be found there. 
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The effectiveness of the external control of this corruption technique is problematic. As 
was underlined earlier, periodic reviews of individual organisations’ public procurement 
activity and the rare systemic reviews by SAO constitute a weak instrument against abuses 
(Báger 2011). When contract award announcements appear in the Public Procurement 
Bulletin, their references to prior call for tenders are checked but procedures are hardly ever 
cancelled due to a missing call for tenders. 
This corruption technique is strongly associated with T2.1-tinkering with thresholds and 
exceptions defining the procedural regime to follow. As when the procedure type prescribes 
publication in the official journal, avoiding publicity becomes harder for issuers. Moreover, 
this technique forms a formidable combination with T2.6-tinkering with the submission 
period as publishing the call for tenders in a difficult to reach location (e.g. a hard to find part 
of the institution’s own homepage) with a very short deadline competition from unwanted 
bidders can be minimized. Finally, this technique may be traded off with T3.3 - strategically 
modifying the call for tenders. 
There is only one direct indicator proposed for this corruption technique focusing on the 
difference between the most widely used publication organ (Public Procurement Bulletin) and 
all other venues: 
A) proportion of procedures without call for tenders in the official journal within all 
procedures. 
This indicator is directly measured by the following formula: 
PNPCit = NNPCit / TNTit 
where PNPCit refers to the proportion of procedures without a call for tenders published in the 
Hungarian Pubic Procurement Bulletin22 within all procedures concluded of the ith unit of 
observation, typically public organisation, over period t, NNPCit denotes the total number of 
procedures without a call for tenders published in the Hungarian Pubic Procurement Bulletin 
of the ith unit of observation during period t, and TNTit refers to the total number of tenders 
concluded by the ith unit of observation over period t. 
Interestingly, there has been a large increase in the proportion of procedures without call 
for tenders in the Public Procurement Bulletin between 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 largely 
coinciding the new government entering office. In 2009-2010 it amounted to 17%-24%, but 
jumped to 57%267% in 2011-2012 (Table 6). While the full account of the reasons behind this 
pattern requires further analysis changes in the Public Procurement Law under the new 
government contributed for sure.  
 
 
                                               
22 This Bulletin also contains copies of announcements in the European Union’s Official Journal (TED) 
issued by Hungarian authorities. 
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Table 6.  
Average proportion of procedures without call for  
tenders in the Public Procurement Bulletin, 2009-20112 
 
Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
2009 0.24 10918 0.43 
2010 0.17 17914 0.38 
2011 0.57 14070 0.49 
2012 0.67 10342 0.47 
2009-2012 0.39 53244 0.49 
Source: PP 
As publication at the issuers’ own website still represents a more transparent solution 
compared to no public announcement at all, it is desirable to collect data, at least a sample, on 
calls for tenders on issuers’ homepages. Collection of textual data has been done, but full 
analysis can commence only later when key information is extracted from the documents. 
T3.3 Strategically modifying the call for tenders 
If an issuer has to publish a call for tenders, but wants to tailor it to benefit a particular bidder 
it faces a considerable information burden. In most markets, a wide range of companies can 
bid. The pool of potential bidders is uncertain for the issuer of tenders due to new companies 
entering the market, others leaving it, or simply the changing willingness of companies to bid 
for the particular tender. Publishing a call for tenders and subsequently observing which 
bidders buy or obtain the tender documentation can reduce the burden of acquiring 
information on potential bidders and the uncertainties of getting the pool of bidders wrong. 
Once information on interested bidders is obtained in such a way, it is easy to modify the 
eligibility and/or assessment criteria to favour the ‘pre-selected bidder’ as opposed to the other 
potential bidders. Furthermore, high frequency of call for tenders’ modifications creates 
uncertainty about the actual requirements and conditions, hence can discourage competition. 
Modifying call for tenders strategically can decrease transparency and discourage competition. 
This technique is primarily based on interview evidence coming from Hungary, so it may 
represent a Hungarian speciality or it may simply have escaped the attention of the literature 
so far. 
Even though inadmissible eligibility or assessment criteria can be and does get detected 
and removed, the control of changing any criteria is very rare if not completely non-existent 
according to our interviewees.  
This corruption technique is intimately linked to T2.2 - tailoring eligibility criteria and 
T2.4 –tailoring assessment criteria, as the combinations can readily increase the techniques’ 
effectiveness. For example, initial eligibility criteria can be set so that it rules out all but one 
bidder, but when an unexpected or inadequately assessed bidder obtains the tender 
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documentation, which could successfully bid for the tender, a modification to the call for 
tenders’ eligibility criteria can exclude the unwanted bidder. 
After identifying two versions of this corruption technique (i.e. modification after 
bidders are known and frequent modifications) it is possible to devise fine-tuned indicators 
gauging each version. However, in order to avoid using too narrowly focused indicators we 
adopt a broader approach and propose to use the metrics already discussed above (see section 
T3.1): 
A) proportion of procedures with call for tenders modified within all procedures. 
T3.4 Excessively pricey and hard to access documentation 
Public procurement tendering is open and transparent as long as the necessary tender 
documents are easily and cheaply accessible. If documents are difficult or expensive to obtain 
some potential bidders may be excluded or at least discouraged from competing. Asking a 
considerable price for tender documents is in principle fair; however, it can exclude less well-
off potential bidders and those bidders who find their chances of winning lower. A rational 
potential bidder would only buy the tender documentation if it deems the expected profit 
(chances of winning * profit earned if winning) higher than the price of tendering (tender 
preparation + tender document costs). If a company knows that it is a sure winner due to its 
corrupt connections it is willing to pay a very high price for the documentation; whereas an 
average bidder with uncertain winning chances would be less willing to pay a high price. 
Hence, it is easy to set the price of documentation so high that it is prohibitive for all the 
bidders except for one. Making the acquisition of tender documents difficult is an additional 
method for increasing the costs of bidding. The easiest way to acquire documents is from the 
internet; however, issuers are free to define the ways of obtaining paper-based tender 
documents from themselves or their designated representatives. Corrupt networks can use 
these techniques for completely eliminating, or at least weakening competition. While this 
method was mentioned by two of our interviewees, we found little evidence of it in the 
literature so this corruption technique is potentially less reliable. 
Collecting fees for providing the tender documentation is justified by the costs of 
compiling them accruing to the issuer. By law, price should reflect costs of producing the 
documents. In practice, it was usual in Hungary to ask for excessive prices up to several 
million HUF (several tens of thousands EUR). This practice has changed lately in Hungary as 
reported by one of our interviewees with legal background, when the Public Procurement 
Arbitration Board has started to force issuers to set more reasonable, that is lower prices. This 
shows that in some respects external control may function well in Hungary. 
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This technique can work most effectively together with others aimed at decreasing 
competition so that they can leave only the desired company standing in the competition. 
One of the large construction companies operating almost exclusively on the public 
procurement market highlighted that high price of tender documentation effectively deters 
them from some tenders. Another interviewee working for a most likely exemplary issuer 
simply put it: “if one wants competition, it puts all the documents on the net accessible for 
free!”. 
There is one proposed direct indicator corresponding to one of the forms of this 
technique23: 
A) price of documentation divided by estimated contract value. 
The price of documentation is expected to reflect the preparation costs of the tender 
documents for the issuer which is, by and large, increasing function of project size. Thus, we 
can consider those documentation prices as cause for suspicion which are excessively 
expensive compared to tenders of similar size. The proposed indicator is: 
APDCVit = Σj ( PDitj / CVitj ) / j 
where APDCVit refers to the average ratio of price for tender documentation over total value of 
contract of the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over period t, PDitj denotes 
the price of tender documentation in the jth procedure of the ith unit of observation during 
period t, and CVitj denotes the value of contract awarded in the jth procedure by the ith unit of 
observation during period t. 
Looking at the distribution of document price to contract value ratio, a familiar picture 
appears: a highly skewed distribution where very few procedures show high corruption risks 
while most of them moderate to low risks only (Figure 13). For example, almost a quarter of 
procedures made the documents available for free. 
  
                                               
23 That is difficult access to documentation was not possible to measure, however, the location of 
accessing the tender documents such as postal address, internet address are regularly reported in call 
for tender announcements so later research can develop an additional indicator. 
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Figure 13.  
Proportion of document price to contract value,  
2009-2012 (ratios smaller than 0.1) 
 
Source: PP 
T3.5 Deliberate errors in document publication 
Preparing and publishing any tender document accurately is essential both for transparency, 
accountability and competition. The simple fact of publishing the necessary announcements is 
far from sufficient for establishing whether these three elementary principles are followed in 
the conduct of an issuer. Accuracy, completeness, and clarity of information are essential 
(OECD 2009). Often, even a small omission or error can have considerable consequences. For 
example, erroneously categorizing a call for tender in the CPV nomenclature can effectively 
exclude potential bidders from a tender as most companies search by CPV codes rather than 
going through all the announcements made each day (there are commercial companies 
offering email alerts to potential bidder companies based on new calls for tenders in markets 
defined by CPV codes). This corruption technique can have basically two effects depending on 
the phase of the public procurement procedure: 1) during the tendering phase, omissions and 
errors can disadvantage some bidders (Ware et al. 2007); 2) during the award decision and 
contract management phase omissions and errors can infringe on the capacity of outsiders to 
hold actors accountable. The latter suggests that the use of this technique is not necessary if 
other corruption techniques already limited the number of bidders while making the 
procedure look by and large legal. 
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While every announcement is checked by the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority 
before publication and corrections are made if necessary, the wide range and frequent errors 
in the actual published documents clearly demonstrates that this check is insufficient. For 
example, contract value or the name of winner are missing in many cases. For most errors, 
even if they are identified by the Authority it can only ask issuers to correct them, but cannot 
deny or considerably delay publication in order to effectively sanction deviance. Nevertheless, 
there are cases when the announcement’s publication date is much after the dispatch date of 
the issuer (i.e. organisation sent it long time before it actually gets published). More research 
is needed to explore why and how this can happen, and most importantly whether 
manipulating actual publication data as compared to dispatch date can be intentional (one 
interviewee suggested it can be, but failed to provide a detailed account of the methods used). 
This corruption technique relates to two different sets of techniques depending on the 
stage of the procurement procedure. First, during the bidding stage, this technique can be very 
well combined with T3.1 - selective information provision. Second, during award decision and 
contract implementation stages, this corruption technique can work closely together with T4.2 
– repeated violations of rules and T5.3 – performance violating contract in order to avoid 
external monitoring and punishment. 
Relating to the first version this technique comes in: a construction company’s public 
procurement manager highlighted in an interview that it has to check personally every plan 
and documentation as much as possible, for example by inspecting the would-be site of 
construction, as her experience is that tender documentation cannot be trusted. While she 
clearly sees incompetence as one major source of problems with the precision of tender 
documentation, she has come across multiple cases where deliberate manipulation of 
documentation took place to grant unfair advantage to the members of a corrupt network. 
There are two direct measures of this corruption technique (sub-type relating to the avoidance 
of external scrutiny): 
A) prevalence of extremely erroneous contract award announcements and 
B) hiding or erroneously reporting the final contract value. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify the content of tender documents compared to 
what actually is on the ground (e.g. whether construction site descriptions are accurate) 
leaving the compliance of administrative records with official requirements the only way to 
build indicators. This, however, raises the risks of conflating a deliberate corruption technique 
with simple administrative error typically due to low administrative capacity. In order to 
minimise the overlap between these two causes, the proposed indicator only focuses on 
omissions and errors of key pieces of information where deviation from official requirements 
is more likely to be deliberate. Contract award announcements are taken as a reference point 
as opposed to all other announcement types we have information about because they are the 
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key documents  which are always available for every procedure. We employed the following 
formula. 
PECit = NECit / TNTit 
where PECit refers to the proportion of procedures with extremely erroneous contract award 
announcements within all procedures concluded of the ith unit of observation, typically public 
organisation, over period t, NECit denotes the total number of procedures with extremely 
erroneous contract award announcements of the ith unit of observation during period t, and 
TNTit refers to the total number of tenders concluded by the ith unit of observation over period 
t. Extremely erroneous contract award announcements were those which lacked or incorrectly 
reported24 any of the following information: 
 Name of winner, 
 Value of contract, and  
 Type of procedure. 
The proportion of announcements with such errors showed strong increase between 
2009-2011, but dropped drastically in 2012 most likely due to the introduction of the new 
public procurement law which saw a more stringent control of announcements (Figure 14). As 
with many other indicators discussed here, the regularity of publishing extremely erroneous 
information is by no means a continuous measure of corruption. Rather, its high prevalence in 
spite of sufficient experience with conducting public procurement is what signals substantial 
corruption risks. 
Figure 14.  
Mean proportion of contract award announcements  
with extremely erroneous information, 2009-2012 (%) 
 
Source: PP 
                                               
24 While using unit prices for reporting the final total contract value is clearly deemed as incorrect 
reporting, this indicator excludes these cases. The reason is that abusing unit prices is a different kind of 
error than simple omission or unclear information provision. Unit prices are discussed in section T4.4. 
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As final total contract value represent one of the key means of outside actors to hold 
issuers to account it is likely that this information will be hidden or erroneously reported by 
corrupt actors. This suspicion was confirmed by a many interviewees and the higher than 
usual number of errors in the contract completion announcements25: almost half of the 
procedures lacked a correct contract completion announcement containing the final contract 
value (Table 7.  
Error statistics of relative value of contract modifications, 2009-2012). 
Table 7.  
Error statistics of relative value of contract modifications, 2009-2012 
 
Frequency % 
Final vs original contract value defined, no error 6961 57.3 
Final vs original contract value defined, but outlier 215 1.8 
No final contract value defined, but there should have 
been 
4975 40.9 
Total 12151 100 
Source: PP 
4.4 Tender evaluation and award decision 
T4.1 Strategically annulling the procedure 
As has been said already, issuers are obliged to follow certain procedures based on the size and 
nature of the prospective procurement contract. However, if the first procedure is annulled, 
for example due to unforeseen circumstances, issuers often have the right to re-launch the 
process, but using an accelerated and less open procedure (e.g. restricted or invitation 
procedure). This is the case not only in Hungary, but in a range of other countries too (OECD 
2007). Annulation can be used strategically for corrupt purposes in at least two ways: first, in 
order to avoid procedures requiring higher degrees of transparency and more open 
competition even though the awarded contract is big and no special exception could be 
invoked. Second, in the case when other corrupt techniques of limiting competition didn’t 
work and a unwanted firm would have to be awarded the contract. So, when other techniques 
failed there is still the option of annulling the whole procedure and start it all over again with 
more effective arsenal of corruption techniques. For this corruption technique, annulation is 
the decision of the issuer. One of the most frequently invoked reasons for annulation is that 
the budget turned out to be insufficient by the time the contract had to be awarded (this 
reason is explicitly banned in the new 2012 Public Procurement Law). 
                                               
25 Arguably, correctly publishing contract completion announcements may be administratively more 
demanding as by the end of a typical contract a large number of potentially complex transactions would 
had to be precisely recorded. 
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Of course, annulation can be simply due to incompetent planning on the side of issuers. 
However, if we only look at issuers with considerable experience with public procurement, for 
example, at least 3 procedures per year, successive annulations of the same public 
procurement procedure may in fact signal strategic behaviour to avoid fair competition and 
decrease transparency. 
As the potential reasons for issuer induced annulation is limited and annulations are 
fairly visible, external control may represent a strong obstacle to the application of this 
technique. In addition, it is also costly for the issuers as they have to re-run the same 
procedure multiple times. Hence, it is likely that this is used either as a ‘solution of last resort’ 
or as a blunt and expensive technique. 
First, this technique is linked in general to all other techniques aiming at decreasing 
competition if it is used once the other techniques failed to produce the desired result. Second, 
it can also be considered as an extension or alternative to the tinkering with thresholds and 
exceptions (T2.1) in order to get the most suitable procedural regime for corrupt conduct. 
Third, this technique is similar in effect to the next technique (T4.2 – violation of public 
procurement rules) as long as it leads to the annulation of the procedure. It is, however, very 
different in origin as it results from the issuer’s decision whereas T4.2 is due to court decision. 
A famous example extensively discussed by the press in Hungary was the contract for 
reconstruction the levee next to the settlement Csongrád at river Tisza.26 It took four 
procedures to award a contract eventually to the same company as originally intended. The 
losing bidders complained several times that the procedure was tailored to one consortium 
close to the government and it also raised suspicion that the issuer annulled the process 
itself27. In addition, the Public Procurement Arbitration Board annulled the procedure twice, 
an issue we will get back to below. 
This corruption technique can be associated with one direct indicator: 
A) proportion of annulled procedures re-launched subsequently  
and indirect indicator: 
B) decrease in the number of bids received in subsequent rounds. 
The regularity of annulling procedures and subsequently re-launching it with slightly 
different conditions directly signals the potential for strategic behaviour. As occasional errors 
can occur in even the cleanest issuer, what indicates heightened corruption risks is the regular 
and repeated annulations initiated by the issuer. As every annulation has to be reported in the 
Public Procurement Bulletin the proposed indicator is a likely precise measure of the potential 
use of this technique: 
                                               
26 
http://index.hu/belfold/2012/09/13/otodszorre_is_kozgep_nyerte_el_a_milliardos_csongradi_munk
at/  
27 http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/adatbazis/mutat/hirdetmeny/portal_16326_2011/  
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PAPRit = APRit / TNPit 
where PAPRit refers to the proportion of annulled procedures re-launched subsequently within 
all procedures initiated of the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over period 
t, APRit denotes the total number of procedures annulled by the issuer (not by the courts) of 
the ith unit of observation during period t, and TNPit refers to the total number of procedures 
initiated by the ith unit of observation over period t. 
While overall the proportion of annulled procedures is rather low approximately 3%, 
annulations tend to cluster with some issuers whose propensity to annul procedures is 
persistently high (Figure 15). 
Figure 15.  
Proportion of annulled procedures by issuer with proportion higher than 0.15, 
2009-2011 (lines represent single issuers’ annulation proportions over time) 
 
Source: PP 
It follows from the above discussion that the major objective of using this corruption 
technique is to limit competition, that is, decreasing the number of bidders to one, even 
though decreased competition can be associated with other measures (e.g. subjective 
evaluation criteria used for arbitrary scoring). Hence, if subsequent rounds of re-launched 
tenders lead to decreased number of bidders it is likely that the underlying rationale of 
annulling the procedure was in line with the described corruption technique. We propose 
therefore the following indirect indicator signalling the potential use of this technique: 
ADRBit = Σj ( NRBAitj - NRBSitj ) / j 
where ADRBit refers to the average difference between the number of bids received in the 
annulled and completed public procurement procedures of the ith unit of observation, 
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typically public organisation, over period t, NRBAitj refers to the number of bids received in the 
jth procedure’s annulled award notice of the ith unit of observation during period t, and 
NRBSitj refers to the number of bids received in the jth procedure’s final successful award 
notice of the ith unit of observation during period t. As multiple annulations can take place 
within the same procedure this indicator simply compares the first and last ‘rounds’ in order to 
simplify the calculations. This is justified on the grounds that intermediary annulations (i.e. 
those happening between the first and last ‘round’) most likely represent unsuccessful 
applications of the technique.  
Unfortunately, this indicator could not be calculated due to technical complexities, 
further work must be done to arrive at a reliable estimate. 
T4.2 Repeated violations of public procurement rules 
The violation of Public Procurement Laws and regulations represents the simplest and crudest 
corruption strategy. As long as violations are not gross, they may remain undetected making 
the completed procurement process look legally acceptable. While violation of some rules is 
also a hallmark of a range of corruption techniques discussed in this section, what makes this 
technique distinct is the repeated violations within the same procedure (Ware et al. 2007; 
World Bank 2007). Assuming that the judicial control is not completely captured by corrupt 
networks, repeated violations mean that the issuer is likely breaching regulations not simply 
out of administrative incompetence, but deliberately in order to benefit a ‘desired’ company. If 
this is really the case, this technique impinges on fair competition and accountability. 
Obviously, not every violation and error is a tool for corruption, only those which appear 
recurrently suggesting strategic use of ‘minor mistakes’ should raise suspicion. 
In principle, public procurement practice is closely monitored and we can safely assume 
that, at least in some cases, judicial control does function properly. But because, external 
control of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board, courts, and SAO is weak in general in 
this field (Báger 2011), it is quite possible that repeated violations are not or partially detected. 
This, of course, limits our ability to use court decisions as a reliable indicator. 
This corruption technique can be linked to most other techniques, especially those directly 
weakening competition.  
An excellent example of this technique is the previously mentioned levee reconstruction 
project at the river Tisza. While on one occasion the issuer itself annulled the procedure, twice 
the Public Procurement Arbitration Board struck it down. This, nevertheless, did not stop the 
issuer from awarding the contract to the same consortium closely associated with the highest 
echelons of the government. 
The only direct indicator for this corruption technique is 
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A) repeated court rulings against the issuer within the same procedure. 
Developing an indicator based on rulings of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board 
or the Hungarian courts potentially suffers from biases as monitoring and adjudication may be 
influenced strategically by corrupt networks (Jancsics and Jávor 2012). In order to minimise 
this bias we only consider cases of repeated court rulings within the same procedure. The logic 
behind this twist is that once the first court ruling was made the case becomes more exposed 
making it harder for corrupt networks to strategically turn off judicial review. Hence, repeated 
court rulings may in fact represent appropriately the number of actual ‘irregularities’ of the 
procedure. Moreover, repeated errors infringing on the Public Procurement Law and other 
regulations are more likely to represent deliberate ‘bending’ of rules rather than simple errors. 
The proposed indicator is as follows: 
 PRCRit = RCRit / TNPit 
where PRCRit refers to the proportion of procedures with more than one court rulings against 
the issuer within all procedures initiated of the ith unit of observation, typically public 
organisation, over period t, RCRit denotes the total number of procedures with more than one 
court ruling against the issuer of the ith unit of observation during period t, and TNPit refers to 
the total number of procedures initiated by the ith unit of observation over period t. 
Using this indicator together with any of the other indicators outlined in this section may 
lead to double-counting some techniques. For example, when the court annuls the procedure 
for reasons already included in other corruption techniques, we count it twice in a composite 
indicator. While in general it may introduce a bias, we don’t think it is an issue as court 
decisions are likely involving larger contracts (administrative fees make it no worth to go for 
smaller contracts) and more extensive violations. Hence, this double counting can be 
considered as weighting the importance of the revealed violations in some cases and simply 
revealing additional corruption risks in others. 
Unfortunately, linking court rulings to public procurement procedures requires a large 
amount of manual labour as there is no standard reference in court rulings to the 
announcement being challenged.28 Further work is needed to finalise this indicator. 
T4.3 Unfair scoring 
Scoring of competing bids takes place every time bids are evaluated on the basis of price plus 
quality. Issuers are obliged to assemble an evaluation committee and keep records of their 
scoring. As the process of scoring is internal to the public organisation and attaching scores to 
subjective criteria (see T2.4) is difficult to effectively control from outside, scoring can be 
                                               
28 In fact sometimes there is no direct reference at all besides the names of plaintiff and respondent and 
the short title of the announcement 
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easily abused for the benefit of a corrupt network (Papanek 2009). If scores are given to 
benefit a ‘desired’ company it clearly infringes upon the principle of fair competition.  
The process of scoring is difficult to control for external bodies in general, but especially 
in the case of subjective evaluation criteria. Bidders who did not win are likely to question the 
fairness of scoring; however, due to privacy law and trade secret considerations their chances 
of an effective challenge are rather low. 
This technique works in tandem with T2.4 – tailoring evaluation criteria, as subjective 
criteria defined already at the outset makes the application of this technique easier. 
According to one interviewee from the construction sector this technique is most likely 
exercised  in a subtle way: the call for tenders defines evaluation criteria regarding non-
quantitative performance and the evaluation committee scores these non-quantitative aspects 
in a barely visible unfair manner by giving the ‘desired bidder only one point in addition to the 
others. Nevertheless, these scores add up in the end just a little bit higher than the best 
‘unwanted’ bidder. 
Due to the lack of publicly available detailed records of the scoring and evaluation 
processes inside the issuer organisations there could be no direct indicator developed. 
Nevertheless, there are three indirect measures29 which could point at the use of this 
technique: 
A) average contract value per weekdays available for decision, 
B) length of evaluation criteria, and  
C) weight of non-price criteria. 
The number of days passed between the submission deadline and the final decision in 
general is likely to indicate the efficiency of the decision making process given the size (and 
complexity) of the contract to be awarded (Heggstad and Froystad 2011; Strand, Ramada, and 
Canton 2011). However, in the case of extremely short periods that is, a couple of days only the 
suspicion may arise that the decision was made in haste without serious consideration rather 
than extremely efficiently. This suspicion can be further strengthened if the total value of the 
contract is taken into account as more expensive contracts tend to be more complex, requiring 
longer time to arrive at an optimal decision. Hence, we propose the following indicator: 
ADDCVit = ( Σj (CVitj / DDitj )) / TNTit 
where ADDCVit refers to the average ratio of total contract value over the number of weekdays 
between submission and decision dates of the ith unit of observation, typically public 
organisation, over period t, DDitj denotes the number of weekdays between submission and 
decision dates in the jth procedure of the ith unit of observation during period t, CVitj denotes 
                                               
29 While in principle extremely short decision periods could be identified in a similar way extremely 
short submission periods were identified, unfortunately, the distribution of decision periods did not 
reveal any obvious cut-point or suspiciously short period (minimum was 7 days). Thus, no indicator is 
developed solely on the basis of decision periods. 
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the value of contract awarded in the jth procedure by the ith unit of observation during period 
t, and TNTit refers to the total number of tenders concluded by the ith unit of observation over 
period t. 
On average, this ratio almost reaches 3 throughout 2009-2011 that is, there were almost 
3 million HUF of contract value for each weekday of submission period. It is noteworthy that 
the distribution of this ratio is highly skewed with only very few very large numbers (Figure 
16). As decision periods may also reflect differences in technology and industry standards, it is 
conceivable that norming by market means leads to a better indicator. 
Figure 16.  
The distribution of average contract value (million HUF)  
per decision period (days), 2009-2011 (ratios < 20) 
 
Source: PP 
The two other indirect indicators have already been discussed above (see T2.4) in detail. 
They are also relevant for this technique as subjective evaluation criteria make it easier and 
therefore more likely to score bids in an unfair manner. Using the same indicators for 
techniques T2.4 and T4.3 reinforces the view that they are typically applied in tandem. 
T4.4 Abusing the unit price of contract value 
As has been outlined already, it is essential for any reporting system on public procurement to 
make information on contract values reliably and transparently available to the wider public. 
In this respect transparency may decrease corruption on its own (Transparency International 
2006). If the contract value is given in unit prices such as HUF per kWh or % of interest rate 
without explicitly specifying the corresponding quantities or at least the estimations of 
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quantities the principle of transparency is violated as it is not possible to know how much 
money is being spent at the end of the day. Using unit prices in public procurement contracts 
can be source of abuse and corruption as reported by our interviewees and international 
examples (OECD 2007). Contracts in unit prices allow for adjusting quantity intransparently 
throughout the lifespan of the contract hence obtaining corruption fee.  
A particular widespread form of this technique can be found in the services sector where 
the pre-selected winner wins the actual tender on the basis of low unit costs. However, during 
delivery the corrupt issuer will allow the winner to invoice larger than actual quantities of at 
least some of the services delivered. ‘Over-invoicing’ is easily done without much risk of 
detection in services sector as hours spent on giving advice, meetings or fixing machines 
cannot be easily controlled externally. Obviously, those bidders which are not offered such a 
deal prior to bidding cannot offer so low prices for the services and lose out in competition 
which on paper looks fair, but in fact is not. 
This corruption technique is closely associated with T3.5 – deliberate errors in document 
publication in its approach and effect, but it doesn’t necessary imply an error in the figures 
presented rather a failure to provide additional information required for fully determining the 
value of a contract. This corruption technique works well with techniques related to 
performance of the contract, especially T5.4 – performance violating the contract, as it renders 
hiding such improper delivery less visible. 
There is only one direct indicator of this corruption technique: 
A) proportion of contracts using unit prices without stated total value, 
while there could be no indirect indicators formulated. 
At the heart of this technique lies the use of unit prices which can be done for a range of 
justifiable and non-corrupt reasons. For example, in the case of loans for a municipality, banks 
would compete on the basis of interest rate on the loan rather than simply on total cost as this 
is the standard pricing method of the industry. Nevertheless, even in standard cases where the 
use of unit prices is reasonable, the final total price of the goods and services delivered must be 
reported at least as an estimate according to the Public Procurement Law in order to avoid 
later intransparent modifications of spending value. The proposed indicator is: 
PCAUPit = NCAUPit / NCAit 
where PCAUPit refers to the proportion of awarded contracts using unit prices over the total 
number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, 
during period t, NCAUPit denotes the total number of awarded contracts using unit prices 
without stated total contract value of the ith unit of observation during period t, and NCAit 
refers to the total number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation over period t. 
Overall, there are very few contracts which are defined in unit prices and their 
proportion displays a strong decreasing trend in the period 2009-2012 (Table 8). 
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Table 8.  
Average proportion of contracts awarded using unit precise  
for defining total contract value, 2009-2012 
 
Mean Nunitp Ntotal 
2009 4.2% 466 10982 
2010 0.3% 59 17769 
2011 0.4% 52 14140 
2012 0.7% 77 10372 
2009-
2011 
1.2% 655 53263 
Source: PP 
4.5 Contract implementation 
T5.1 Modifying the contract strategically 
What gets delivered by the end of the contractual period is often different from what was 
originally contracted. If this deviation is not the result of plain negligence of contractual 
obligations then a contract has to be officially modified and announced in the Public 
Procurement Bulletin. While contract modifications can take place due to a range of justifiable 
reasons, such as exceptionally bad weather constraining construction works, it can also be 
abused for corrupt purposes (European Court of Auditors 2012; Papanek 2009). Corruption 
rent can be earned by increasing prices, extending deadlines, and diminishing quality each of 
which is regularly observed in a range of countries (Heggstad and Froystad 2011; Kenny and 
Musatova 2010; Lengwiler and Wolfstetter 2006; OECD 2007; Transparency International 
2006; Ware et al. 2007). This technique infringes on the principle of accountability, but it can 
also harm fair competition. This is the case when the ‘desired’ bidder knows about the 
possibility of contract modification prior to bidding enabling it to offer lower price and/or 
higher quality than its competitors  
An effective constraint on this technique is that every modification of the original 
contract has to be announced in the Public Procurement Bulletin and all the other bidders 
have to be notified. There are no indications of regular breach of these obligations either 
according to interviews and media reports or court decisions. If the contract modification 
concerns aspects of the tender relevant for selecting the winning bidder those who lost the 
tender can challenge the contract award in court. In addition, supporting bodies like the 
National Development Agency try to minimize contract modification as much as possible due 
to EU funding regulations in particular. 
This technique can be employed simultaneously with virtually any other technique. 
Nevertheless, it may be a substitute for any corruption technique limiting competition in the 
bidding phase as there is no need for modifying the contract if the ‘desired winner’ could offer 
a higher price and/or lower quality already at the outset. It is also a substitute for T5.4 – 
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performance violating contract, as if simple violation is feasible it is not necessary to risk 
raising attention through modifying the contract with its publication requirements. 
There could be three direct indicators conceived for this corruption technique while 
there is no indirect measure: 
A) proportion of modified contracts, 
B) difference between the awarded and final contract value, and 
C) difference between originally planned and final completion period. 
As highlighted above, contracts can be modified for a range of reasons; however, those 
markets or issuers where contract modification is a regular practice may still be considered as 
higher corruption risk markets or issuers. This is because, we can expect issuers to develop 
specific skills over time to manage more complicated or more uncertain contracts rendering 
contract modifications for non-corrupt reasons an exception rather than the rule. By 
implication, the proposed indicator is:  
PMCit = NMCit / NCAit 
where PMCit refers to the proportion of awarded contracts which were subsequently modified 
over the total number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation, typically public 
organisation, over period t, NMCit denotes the total number of awarded contracts which were 
subsequently modified of the ith unit of observation during period t, and NCAit refers to the 
total number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation over period t. 
Overall, contract modifications are surprisingly frequent events, annually between 4% to 
16% of all contracts were subsequently modified. This underlies the importance of the contract 
implementation phase compared to the contract award phase in terms of final outcomes. What 
is even more surprising is that a large number of contracts, over 2300, were modified more 
than once (Figure 17). On average modified contracts were modified 2.6 times. Contract 
modification have experienced a considerable spike in 2010 and 2011, that is after the new 
government came into power suggesting the potential links between electoral cycles and 
contract modification activities. 
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Figure 17.  
Number of contract modifications per contract, 2009-2011  
(only those contracts are depicted which were modified at least once) 
 
Source: PP 
Whether a contract has been modified or not is a rather blunt indicator of corruption 
risks as it leaves aside two major ways of earning corrupt rents: 1) increasing final contract 
value and 2) increasing completion period for saving production costs. In order to gauge the 
first kind of corrupt practice, the following direct indicator of the corruption technique is 
proposed: 
ARVCMit = ( Σj ((FCVitj – OCVijt) / OCVitj ) / NCAit 
where ARVCMit refers to the average relative value of contract modifications30 of the ith unit of 
observation, typically public organisation, over period t, FCVit denotes the final contract value 
in the jth procedure of the ith unit of observation during period t, OCVit refers to the original 
contract value of the jth procedure by the ith unit of observation over period t, and NCAit refers 
to the total number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation over period t. This 
indicator takes into account that in absolute terms larger contracts are more likely to have 
larger deviations, hence a proportionate indicator is suggested. 
                                               
30 This excludes the increases in contract value due to utilizing the pre-defined reserves. This source of 
additional spending as a corruption indicator is discussed below in section T5.2. 
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The final contract values differ in a great number of cases from the originally contracted 
contract values both exceeding it and falling under it (Figure 18) while the publication of these 
figures is frown with a number of errors (see section T3.5). Over 80% of the observed 
procedures fall within +/- 1% of the original contract value. Interestingly, in slightly more than 
7% of the observed procedures, the final contract value excessively surpasses the original 
contract value (taking a 10% price increase as a threshold, arguably an arbitrary cut-point). 
 
Figure 18.  
Distribution of procedures according to the relative value of contract 
modifications, 2009-2012 
 
Source: PP 
Note: Contract value deviations less than 80% and more than 500% were 
removed because they most likely represent data errors (for more details see 
section T3.5). 
The ‘well-connected’ winner can also decrease its production costs by increasing the time 
available for delivery as it gives the supplier more flexibility to economise on its production 
factors and deliver when it is most beneficial for itself. This of course implies costs to the 
issuer in terms of foregone benefits of using the supplied products or goods. In order to 
capture this kind of potentially corrupt behaviour we propose the following indicator: 
ARTCMit = ( Σj ((FCTitj – OCTijt) / OCTitj ) / NCAit 
where ARTCMit refers to the average relative change in the length of delivery due to contract 
modifications of the ith unit of observation, typically public organisation, over period t, FCTit 
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denotes the final contract length in the jth procedure of the ith unit of observation during 
period t, OCTit refers to the original contract length of the jth procedure by the ith unit of 
observation over period t, and NCAit refers to the total number of contracts awarded by the ith 
unit of observation over period t. This indicator takes into account that in absolute terms 
longer contracts are more likely to have longer changes, hence a proportionate indicator is 
suggested. 
A picture very similar to contract values is revealed by this indicator, albeit deviations 
are even more rare in this case (Figure 19). A large majority, about 90% of contracts has 
exactly the planned contract length, whereas only 4% of contracts considerably exceeds the 
originally planned or contracted length (taking a 10% increase in contract length as an 
arbitrary cut-point). 
Figure 19.  
Distribution of awarded contracts according to the relative  
change in contract length, 2009-2012, % 
 
Source: PP 
T5.2 Abusing an add-on contract or emergency reserve 
This corruption technique comes in two variants sharing the same logic, but differing in the 
method of realisation. First, once a contract is awarded, the need for additional but linked 
services or goods can arise, justifying the award of one or more add-on contracts. For example, 
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unforeseen characteristics of a construction site may require additional work to be completed 
such as removing previously unknown objects from the site. This, nevertheless, creates the 
opportunity to extract rents in a corrupt manner (Papanek 2009). Invoking some sort of 
technical reason – justified or not – (e.g. that the company is already on the construction site 
with its machines and people) is sufficient to invite only the winner of the prior contract to the 
public procurement procedure for the add-on contract (European Court of Auditors 2012). 
Then the sole bidder can set a price substantially above market price earning extra profit for 
the corrupt network. If the well-connected bidder knows about the potential for add-on 
contracts it can offer low price and/or high quality for the first contract, even if it loses money 
on it, as it will be able to more than compensate for the losses in the second or later contracts.  
Second, additional services and goods can also be delivered within the framework of the main 
contract if it contained a reserve for unforeseen circumstances. According to interviewees, 
winning a contract at a competitive market price knowing that 10-15% of extra money will 
surely accompany the main contract from the reserve for ‘unforeseen’ events is the major 
technique for extracting the corrupt rent in Hungarian large infrastructure projects. While this 
variant of the corruption technique is essentially the same as the use of add-on contracts, it 
doesn’t require any additional announcement or external intervention. Hence, it is very 
difficult to externally monitor. 
While splitting up contracts is heavily regulated by the Public Procurement Law, it is 
relatively easy in complex projects, especially in construction, to name some unforeseen 
circumstances based on which add-on contracts can be awarded in a subsequent procedure. In 
addition, if the add-on contracts fall outside the Public Procurement Law, for example because 
they are small, then monitoring and external review becomes difficult.  
A typical example of abusing add-on contracts was shared by one of our interviewees 
working as a supplier in the healthcare sector for several decades: “the contract for delivery of 
expensive machinery can be awarded to a company offering impossibly low prices making a 
considerable loss on the deal. However, moving the machines within the hospital from one 
room to another is not part of the original contract, rather there will be a separate contract 
between the hospital and the company using inflated prices (not announced anywhere 
publicly). For example 100 000 HUF (350 EUR) for moving a machine form one room to 
another, practically moving it 10 meters. Then you just need to move those machines a couple 
of times back and forth and you can imagine the amount of profit generated…”.  
An example for abusing emergency reserves comes from a large highway construction 
project where, according to the interviewee, it was easy to find justification for exhausting the 
contractual reserves simply by referring to the need for building auxiliary roads for the 
construction site. Such roads are built when bad weather such as heavy rain makes it hard to 
approach the construction site and deliver the necessary equipment and material. It is unlikely 
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that any review body would go and check weather data and contest the necessity of building 
expensive auxiliary roads. 
Abusing add-on contracts comes very close to T2.1 - tinkering with thresholds and 
exceptions, but in this case at least one of the contracts is awarded under the umbrella of the 
Public Procurement Law and rules on combining contracts and exceptions are circumvented 
only for the other contract(s). Abusing emergency reserves is very similar in effect to T5.1 – 
modifying the contract strategically with the important difference that the contract 
modification can be achieved within the framework of the original contract. Furthermore, both 
of the variants of this technique can be substitutes for the techniques limiting competition 
during the bidding phase as there is no need to limit competition if the ‘pre-selected’ bidder 
can win through a fair competitive procedure and subsequently increase its profit through 
abusing add-on contracts and emergency reserves. 
There could be conceived two direct indicators for this corruption technique, reflecting 
the two variants it comes in: 
A) proportion of add-on contracts, and 
B) proportion of contracts exhausting the planned reserves. 
Focusing simply on the regularity of using add-on contracts signals the most substantive 
corruption risks, especially if this practice is standard in the given context. As add-on contracts 
may well fall below the threshold for applying the Public Procurement Law many of the less 
costly instances of this techniques cannot be recorded by our database. The proposed indicator 
is the following: 
PAOCit = NAOCit / NCAit 
where PAOCit refers to the proportion of awarded contracts followed by at least one add-on 
contract over the total number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation, typically 
public organisation, over period t, NAOCit denotes the total number of awarded contracts 
followed by at least one add-on contract of the ith unit of observation during period t, and 
NCAit refers to the total number of contracts awarded by the ith unit of observation over 
period t. 
Our method of identifying add-on contracts could only rely on simple key-word search in 
the contract title which often highlight the fact that a contract is on top of an existing one. 
Unfortunately, there is no standardized definition in the Public Procurement Law of add-on 
contracts and no uniform way of linking add-on contracts to main contracts. By implication, 
our identification procedure may only scratch the surface of the phenomenon. We identified 
128 add-on contracts throughout 2009-2012 with a total value of 6.5 million EUR. 
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Gauging the regularity of exhausting the pre-defined emergency reserve can be directly 
measured in the following way even though some issuers may not readily report the reserves 
built-in their contracts31: 
PEERit = NEECit / NECAit 
where PEERit refers to the proportion of awarded contracts exhausting the emergency reserve 
over the total number of contracts containing such a reserve provision awarded by the ith unit 
of observation, typically public organisation, over period t, NEECit denotes the total number of 
awarded contracts exhausting the emergency reserve of the ith unit of observation during 
period t, and NECAit refers to the total number of contracts containing a reserve provision 
awarded by the ith unit of observation over period t. 
While it was possible to screen contracts for identifying whether they contain an 
emergency reserve, number of cases is too low to provide a meaningful analysis. Further work 
is needed in this respect to identify more relevant cases. 
T5.3 Performance violating the contract 
At the end of the day, looking at contractual relationships, reported characteristics of public 
tendering and contracts are useful only to the degree they reflect what is happening in reality, 
that is whether performance is according to contract or not. However, if the issuer and 
contractor are parts of the same corrupt network, it is relatively easy to simply deviate from 
contractual obligations secretly and earn profit on it. This can be done by lower than agreed 
quality or lower quantity (Meagher Patrick 1997; Piga 2011). Such a corruption technique 
violates the principle of accountability and it has been observed in a range of countries (OECD 
2007; Papanek 2009; Transparency International 2006). A simple way to implement such 
transactions is to bribe the technical controller or involve the controllers in the network 
directly. In the case of large construction projects, low quality or deficient quantity may not be 
visible at all at for a couple of years. Often quoted examples by our interviewees were lower 
than contracted quality cables and tubes in the wall or deficient strength of the base for roads 
due to lower than contracted quantity of some expensive material.  
If control was ineffective during the construction phase, it is very difficult to exercise 
effective ex-post control in the case of construction projects. The only means to keep this 
corruption technique at bay in construction projects is the effective enforcement of guarantee 
clauses forcing the suppliers to factor in future repair costs under a scenario that their 
‘connections’ may not be in power anymore. For services contracts, performance cannot be 
                                               
31 While there are numerous examples of reporting contractual emergency reserves, there is no clear 
evidence that this practice would be mandatory for every issuer or that the Public Procurement 
Authority would regularly control and enforce its reporting. Hence, we have the suspicion that the above 
indicator is downward biased. 
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effectively checked in many cases if the buyer and contractor cooperate in perpetrating 
corruption (see at section T5.2 on the example of add-on services contracts). 
This corruption technique can be combined with practically any of the above techniques, 
while it may be a substitute for T5.1 – modifying contracts strategically as modification is not 
necessary if contractual obligations can be simply violated without consequences. 
Unfortunately, due to its invisible nature even to thorough audits, this corruption 
technique could not be associated with any direct or indirect indicators. It is, nevertheless, 
suggested that we can consider this technique as an unmeasured, but very likely correlate of 
the above techniques. Based on media reports, low quality/quantity performance is typical of 
high corruption risk contracts. 
4.6 Summary of corruption techniques and their indicators 
As there are many corruption techniques and indicators, it is worth summarizing the above 
discussion in one table outlining corruption techniques and the corresponding direct and 
indirect indicators (Table 9). It is clear from the above discussion as well as the below table 
that a number of indicators could signal multiple techniques and that some techniques are 
likely substitutes or complements for each other bearing consequences for the correlations 
across their indicators. Later on, these hypothesized relationships across indicators can be 
used for verifying corruption indicators. 
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Table 9.  
Summary of corruption techniques and their indicators 
ID Name Direct indicator Indirect indicator 
T1.1 Defining unnecessary needs - - 
T1.2 
Defining needs to benefit a particular 
supplier 
A) Prevalence of avoiding centralised procurement - 
T2.1 
Tinkering with thresholds and 
exceptions 
A) Proportion of non-open procedures 
B) Average corruption risk score of procedures followed 
C) Frequency of actual contract value above estimated contract value 
D) Contract value according to Public Procurement Law/total 
procurement contract value 
T2.2 Tailoring eligibility criteria A) Length of eligibility criteria - 
T2.3 
Abusing formal and administrative 
requirements 
A) Length of eligibility criteria  
B) Proportion of excluded bids 
- 
T2.4 Tailoring evaluation criteria 
A) Length of evaluation criteria 
B) Weight of non-price criteria 
- 
T2.5 Using long term complex contracts 
A) Combined value of framework contracts and PPPs / total contract 
value 
B) Average contract duration 
- 
T2.6 Tinkering with submission period 
A) Proportion of tenders with accelerated submission periods 
B) Proportion of tenders with extremely short submission periods 
C) Average contract value per weekday available for submission 
- 
T3.1 Selective information provision - 
A) Proportion of tenders with extremely short submission 
periods 
B) Proportion of procedures with call for tenders modified within 
all procedures 
T3.2 
Avoiding publication of call for 
tenders 
A) Proportion of tenders without call for tenders in the official journal - 
T3.3 
Strategically modifying call for 
tenders 
A) Proportion of procedures with call for tenders modified within all 
procedures 
- 
T3.4 
Excessively pricey documents, 
difficult access to documents 
A) Price of documentation/estimated contract value - 
T3.5 
Deliberate errors in document 
publication 
A) Prevalence of extremely erroneous contract award announcements 
B) Hiding or erroneously reporting the final contract value 
- 
T4.1 Strategically annulling procedures A) Proportion of annulled procedures re-launched subsequently B) Decrease in the number of bids received in subsequent rounds 
T4.2 
Repeated violations of public 
procurement rules 
A) Repeated court rulings against the issuer within the same procedure - 
T4.3 Unfair scoring - 
A) Average contract value per weekday available for decision 
B) Length of evaluation criteria 
C) Weight of non-price criteria 
T4.4 Abusing unit prices in the contract A) Proportion of contracts using unit prices - 
T5.1 Modifying contracts strategically 
A) Proportion of modified contracts 
B) Difference between the awarded and final contract value 
C) Difference between originally planned and final completion period 
- 
T5.2 Abusing add-on contracts 
A) Proportion of add-on contracts 
B) Proportion of contracts exhausting the planned reserves 
- 
T5.3 Performance violating contract - - 
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5. Instead of conclusions: the use of such an inventory and some 
reservations 
According the academic literature, interviews, and the media analysis, the list of corruption 
techniques in use has not changed much in the last 10 years in Hungary or internationally. 
While quantitative analysis revealed that the prevalence of individual techniques changed 
probably due to regulatory action and the evolution of corruption networks’ resources. These 
observations suggests that there may be a reliable basis for the time series analysis 
performed later. 
The indicators presented in this paper by no means exhaust the full list of corruption 
techniques and the potential measurement tools. On the one hand, they can only represent 
the best available evidence collected by the authors. On the other hand, they primarily relate 
to the Hungarian and Eastern European context. For these reasons, this paper shall be 
considered as a living book to which further techniques and indicators will be added as more 
evidence is unearthed either from Hungary or from other countries. Currently, research by 
the authors and further colleagues is ongoing in a range of countries such as Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia which hopefully will add further detail and 
evidence to this list.  
5.1 Use of such an inventory 
First and foremost, the long list of corruption techniques and the corresponding indicators 
set out above provide a solid basis on which indicator verification can take place and a 
composite corruption indicator can be built. Any composite indicator developed from these 
elementary measures should take into account the substitutability and synergies existing 
between many of the above variables. Hence, the analysis of their co-variation can increase 
our trust in their validity and usefulness as indicators of corruption. In a further paper, the 
authors links each of these elementary indicators situated on the input side of the corruption 
process to outcome indicators of the corrupt procurement process. Outcome indicators in 
this respect directly relate to the corrupt selection of bidders. Examples include single bidder 
contracts, exclusion of all but one bidder, or political office of winning bidder’s owners. 
Second, while the above list may appear very long and some description very 
cumbersome, it allows for a detecting changes over time in the relative use of these 
techniques. Thus, it also increases our confidence in linking the whole set of corruption 
indicators to the underlying actual level of corruption as hopefully only a few major 
techniques remained unaccounted for. 
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Third, this list may also be useful for audit and control institutions which aim at 
curbing corruption in public procurement and other areas of public spending in which 
bidding and auctions are a major method of resource allocation (e.g. EU funding for 
enterprise development or publicly owned land allocation). 
5.2 Interpretation challenges 
There are three main challenges to this paper’s approach as we can see: 
1. The benchmark is moving: the legal and societal norms are changing over time, 
so does the benchmark according to which we define corruption. But, principles and 
overarching objectives of public procurement are stable throughout our observation 
period hence this problem can be partially sidelined. Of course, the details of the legal 
framework are changing constantly which may be considered as a corruption risk on 
its own, but these can be taken into account in the details of the indicators developed 
without touching on the underlying principles (e.g. legally binding thresholds may 
change from year to year, the underlying behaviour of abusing exceptions remains 
the same and can be precisely measured). 
2. Confounding administrative incompetence and corruption: Arguably, many 
of the behavioural patterns revealed by our indicators can also be produced by simple 
administrative incompetence that has nothing to do with corruption. On the one 
hand, carefully defining corruption indicators may solve a large part of this critique, 
as some non-random, but moderate values may very well result from incompetent 
procurement management, however, recurrent and gross errors and misconduct 
suggest deliberate action. On the other hand, systematically controlling for 
administrative capacity from independent sources such as the Treasury’s institutional 
annual wage statistics and testing relationships among individual indicators can 
vastly increase our confidence in measurement and refine the indicators (e.g. length 
of eligibility criteria in general is unrelated to the decrease in the number of bidders 
while above a certain threshold it turns out to be a significant and powerful 
predictor). Nevertheless, one could argue that administrative incompetence may very 
well co-evolve with corruption. Therefore, to some degree, disentangling the two may 
not be fully possible (Golden and Picci 2005). 
3. Indicators and underlying mechanism describe attempts at solving the 
widespread problem of low trust in business transactions rather than 
corruption:  In a low trust environment where many companies cannot be trusted 
to deliver, official records are imprecise, and the courts are inefficient at resolving 
business disputes the behaviour described as corrupt may very well aim at getting 
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things done in spite of generally unreliable business relationships. For example, 
deliberately tailoring the tender to the company of a cousin may serve the public 
interest if the family tie is used by the officials to enforce the contract. Now, this often 
implies an extra costs which we interpreted as corrupt rent; however, it may simply 
be the cost of extra-contractual monitoring and enforcement mechanism that has 
nothing to do with corruption. Further qualitative and quantitative work is needed to 
rule out this alternative explanation. 
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Appendix A-examples of corruption techniques in the Hungarian 
media 
 
This appendix contains more detailed information about the methods and results of the 
media review conducted in order to support the development of corruption techniques and 
indicators in section 4. 
The keywords used in identifying potentially relevant articles from the complete 
population of articles in our database referred to corruption, embezzlement, bribery, and 
cronism. In Hungarian, these were: antikorrupciós, korrupció-ellenes, korrupció-megelőzési, 
korrupcióellenes, korrupciómegelőzési, korrupciómentes, korrupciómentesen, 
korrupciómentesség, korrupciómentesít, korrupciótlanítási, csúszópénz, kenőpénz, 
kenőpénzes, közkenőpénz, megken, Korrupciókutató-központ, korrupció, korrupció-
elterjedtség, korrupció-kutató, korrupció-érzékelési, korrupciófelismerési, korrupciógyanús, 
korrupciógyár, korrupciós, corrupt, korruptabb, mutyi, mutyizik, mutyizás, pénzmosás, 
megveszteget, megvesztegethető, megvesztegetés, megvesztegető, veszteget, vesztegetett, 
vesztegetés, vesztegetési. 
After eliminating articles which discussed the same case, we ended up with 42 articles 
which made concrete references to at least one potentially or actually corrupt public 
procurement procedure and revealed at least one specific corruption technique. Mapping 
each article according to the techniques discussed can be found below (Table 10) 
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Table 10.  
Corruption techniques’ discussion in the Hungarian media, 2008-2012 
c.tech. 
ID corr. techn. Name / article ID** 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
T1.1 Defining unnecessary needs 
   
x 
           
x 
                
x 
         
T1.2 
Defining needs to benefit a 
particular supplier 
x 
  
x 
            
x 
                        
x 
T2.1 
Tinkering with thresholds and 
exceptions   
x 
 
x x x x 
 
x 
  
x x 
  
x 
  
x 
 
x 
    
x 
 
x x 
 
x x 
      
x 
 
x 
T2.2 Tailoring eligibility criteria x x 
 
x 
    
x 
 
x x 
   
x x 
     
x x x x 
 
x 
              
T2.3 
Abusing formal and administrative 
requirements                          
x 
                
T2.4 Tailoring evaluation criteria 
                         
x 
 
x 
              
T2.5 Using long term complex contracts 
 
x 
             
x 
                          
T2.6 Tinkering with submission period 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
     
x 
     
x x 
                     
x 
 
T3.1 Selective information provision x 
                                         
T3.2 
Avoiding publication of call for 
tenders   
x 
 
x x x x 
 
x 
  
x x 
  
x 
  
x 
 
x 
    
x 
 
x x 
 
x x 
      
x 
 
X 
T3.3 
Strategically modifying call for 
tenders                                           
T3.4 
Excessively pricey documents, 
difficult access to documents                                           
T3.5 
Deliberate errors in document 
publication                                           
T4.1 Strategically annulling procedures 
                        
x 
            
x* x 
 
x 
 
T4.2 
Repeated violations of public 
procurement rules                     
x 
   
x 
             
x 
   
T4.3 Unfair scoring 
                                          
T4.4 Abusing unit prices in the contract 
                                          
T5.1 Modifying contracts strategically 
       
x 
        
x 
                         
T5.2 Abusing add-on contracts 
                
x 
                     
x 
   
T5.3 Performance violating contract 
             
x 
                  
x 
         
Note: * combined with data from MaKAB; ** Titles and hyperlinks to the articles can be found below 
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Table 11.  
IDs, titles, and hyperlinks of articles discussing corruption techniques in the Hungarian media, 2008-2012 (linked to Table 
10), continued overleaf 
ID title source 
1 Most 100 ezer forintos bicikliket venne a Posta http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/pst090122/  
2 Háziversenyen dőlt el a papírtender http://index.hu/belfold/2009/11/05/haziversenyen_dolt_el_a_papirtender/  
3 Fidesz: Panírban számolták a kenőpénzt http://index.hu/belfold/2010/03/31/fidesz_panirban_szamoltak_a_kenopenzt/  
4 Ejtették a kellemetlenné vált ötmilliárdos légifotóbizniszt http://index.hu/belfold/2010/10/28/otmilliardot_sporolt_az_index_az_orszagnak/  
5 Az NBH-nak is kínos az eredetiségvizsgálós cég bűnügye http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20100311-mentesseg-a-kozbeszerzes-alol-nemzetbiztonsagi-okok-miatt.html  
6 
Hat nap alatt költött 770 milliót a Daimler-botrányban felbukkanó 
Volánbusz 
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20100324-daimlerugy-hallgat-a-mercedes-a-magyarorszagi-korrupcios-vadakrol.html  
7 Trükkös HM-es ingatlanüzemeltetés http://www.mno.hu/portal/781468  
8 A pártfinanszírozás debreceni modellje http://www.nol.hu/belfold/20110430-a_debreceni_modell  
9 Gyanús elemek a csuklósbusz- tenderben? Demszkynek korai az idő http://mno.hu/portal/541455  
10 Milliárdok a Kossuth téri mélygarázsra http://mno.hu/portal/585854  
11 Volt HM-es dandártábornokot vádolnak vesztegetéssel http://hvg.hu/itthon/20110927_katona_karoly_dandartabornok#rss  
12 Jól van, Zsoltikám: egy Nokiás-doboz hányattatásai http://m.index.hu/belfold/budapest/2011/10/08/egy_nokias-doboz_hanyattatasai/  
13 Verseny nélküli megbízás a Közbeszerzések Tanácsánál http://www.vg.hu/kozelet/jog/verseny-nelkuli-megbizas-a-kozbeszerzesek-tanacsanal-363931  
14 A Lakos család esete a budapesti beruházásokkal http://hetivalasz.hu/reflektor/szennyes-25374/  
15 Úton állók http://hetivalasz.hu/itthon/uton-allok-18664/  
16 Rendőrvicc http://hetivalasz.hu/itthon/rendorvicc-23619/  
17 Korrupciós kiskáté kezdo vállalkozóknak http://index.hu/belfold/2011/12/09/korrupcios_kiskate_kezdo_vallalkozoknak/  
18 Feljelentés gyanúsan gyors közbeszerzés miatt http://index.hu/belfold/2012/08/21/gyanusan_gyors_kozbeszerzes_miatt_tesz_feljelentest_az_lmp/  
19 Villámtendert írt ki autóvásárlásra a rendőrség http://index.hu/belfold/2012/08/24/villamtendert_irt_ki_autovasarlasra_a_rendorseg/  
20 
A verseny csak látszat? - sorra nyeri a tendereket a volt Fidesz-
pártigazgató cége 
https://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/a_verseny_csak_latszat_sorra_nyeri_a_tendereket_a_volt_fidesz-
partigazgato_cege.530349.html  
21 Kétmilliós bírság az OMSZ-nek az esetkocsik beszerzése miatt http://index.hu/belfold/2012/06/06/ketmillios_birsag_az_omsz-nek_az_esetkocsik_beszerzese_miatt/  
22 Titkosították a Ludovika Campus beruházását is http://index.hu/belfold/2012/08/08/titkositottak_a_ludovika_campus_beruhazasat_is/  
23 Budapest Szíve európai uniós bírságot kaphat http://index.hu/belfold/budapest/2012/03/06/tarlost_es_rogant_egyutt_szivatja_az_eu/  
24 Egy kicsit könnyebb lesz lopni a MÁV-nál-Cégekre szabott beszerzések http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2012/09/10/mav/  
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25 Ötödik nekifutásra tudott csak nyerni a Zsurmó Csongrádban http://index.hu/belfold/2012/09/13/otodszorre_is_kozgep_nyerte_el_a_milliardos_csongradi_munkat/  
26 Menő korrupciós technikák http://www.fn.hu/cegek/20080611/meno_korrupcios_technikak/  
27 MSZP: lopva költ a kormány http://www.hir24.hu/belfold/2011/08/25/mszp-lopva-kolt-a-kormany/ 
28 Hogyan rothasztja a túlzott győzni akarás a társadalmat? http://www.fn.hu/belfold/20100421/hogyan_rothasztja_tulzott_gyozni/  
29 Egymilliárdért szerez be nyomkövetőket a rendőrség http://index.hu/belfold/2012/10/31/egymilliardert_szerez_be_nyomkovetoket_a_rendorseg/  
30 Projektiroda-vezető lett, akitől félmilliárdot követelnek http://index.hu/belfold/2012/11/22/projektiroda_vezeto_lett_akitol_felmilliardot_kovetelnek/  
31 
Egy NFÜ-s vezető egykori üzlettársa is nyertese a kétmilliárdos 
megbízásnak 
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110220-nemzeti-fejlesztesi-ugynokseg-draga-tanacsadoi-szerzodese-a.html  
32 Versenymentes ügyvédek http://www.nol.hu/archivum/archiv-482235 
33 Az orvosbárókat kell meggyőzni http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20120531_korhazi_korrupcio_orvosbarok#rss  
34 A gemkapoccsal is mutyiztak az önkormányzatok? http://www.fn.hu/belfold/20091016/gemkapoccsal_is_mutyiztak/  
35 Újra tendergyőztes a Fidesz volt kabinettitkára http://index.hu/belfold/2012/04/04/ujra_tendergyoztes_a_fidesz_volt_kabinettitkara/  
36 Megint az IMG nyert egy állami tenderen http://index.hu/kultur/media/2012/11/12/az_img_kapja_az_mtva_1_5_milliardjat/  
37 Offshore lovag a közbeszerzési bizottság elnöke? http://varanus.blog.hu/?utm_source=ketrec&utm_medium=link&utm_content=2013_02_01&utm_campaign=index  
38 Nem tudtunk hülyébbek lenni a kormánynál http://index.hu/belfold/2013/02/12/megprobaltunk_hulyebbek_lenni_a_kormanynal/  
39 Két forintot engedett az árból a Közgép - kétmilliárddal emelte a tétet 
http://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/ket_forintot_engedett_az_arbol_a_kozgep_ketmilliarddal_emelte_a 
_tetet.552308.html 
40 Közbeszerzés nélkül épül újjá a fél Belváros http://index.hu/belfold/2013/05/16/kozbeszerzes_nelkul_epul_ujja_a_belvaros/  
41 Bűzlött az iskolagyümölcs-tender, lefújták http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/06/12/budos_volt_az_iskolagyumolcs-tender_lefujtak/ 
42 A kormány kedvenc újjáépítői http://index.hu/belfold/2013/07/05/a_kormany_kedvenc_ujjaepitoi/  
 
 
